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UN victory for Timor 
Indonesia suffered a double humiliation at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights this year. 
An East Timor resolution, resoundingly adopted by 23 votes to 12 with 15 abstentions, is a disaster 
for Indonesia. It calls for investigation of the human rights situation by four special rapporteurs who 
should visit the territory this year. This is a serious blow for newly re-elected Suharto and ABRI. 
Despite all Indonesia's attempts to remove the "stone from 
its shoe", East Timor remains firmly on the UN agenda. In 
the resolution on the situation in the territory, the Commis-
sion expresses its "deep concern" at the reports of continu-
ing human rights abuses in East Timor. 
The resolution follows the Consensus Statement agreed at 
last year's Commission. The Commission acknowledges the 
failure of Indonesia to honour its commitments and: 
* calls on it to ensure all East Timorese in custody are 
treated in accordance with international humanitarian law 
and to expand NGO access; 
* expresses its concern about the investigations of the 12 
November 1991 massacre; and 
* urges the government to invite four special rapporteurs 
& working groups to the territory (this is thought to be 
unprecedented). 
The Commission also invites the Secretary-General to 
release the report of his special envoy, Amos Wako. Wako 
will return to East Timar in March or April this year: his 
report from 1992 remains secret but informed sources 
describe it as "horrific". 
The last resolution on East Timar was in 1983 and dealt 
with the right to self-determination for East Timor. 
Hardline mistake 
The draft resolution, proposed and supported by the 
European Community under the Presidency of Denmark, 
was finally voted after 48 hours delay. 
Indonesia maintained a hardline approach throughout, 
repeatedly breaking off negotiations, then re-opening them. 
Everybody expected a consensus statement: the damage for 
Indonesia from a resolution going against them was far too 
great. Yet, despite 5 redrafts of the consensus statement 
proposed by the co-sponsors of the resolution and meetings 
between Denmark, United States and Indonesia, the regime 
refused to budge. They claimed that there was no further 
need for investigations in East Timor and that, rather than 
expecting them to do more, a consensus should congratulate 
them on the steps they had taken since last year. 
Clearly the Indonesian delegation knew this would be 
unacceptable to the majority but they were determined that 
East Timor should be taken off the UN agenda. 
Military pressure 
The main stumbling block to negotiations on a consensus 
was the provision for a continuing investigation into the 
massacre. The line taken by the Indonesian delegation was 
that in 1992 the Commission had adopted a consensus in 
the wake of the massacre: this year there was no massacre 
so there should be no action! This argument smacks of 
military involvement. 
Also the Indonesian delegation refused to accept that the 
reports of the special rapporteurs should be ready for the 
next session of the Commission. 
UK and Germany favour guns 
Indonesia was confident that a resolution on East Timor 
would be defeated. And maybe they had reason to be, as 
vice-chair of the Commission this year and chair of the 
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Non-Aligned Movement (of whom 10 were voting Com-
mission members this year) as well as being a member of 
the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and co-sponsor 
with France of the peace talks in Cambodia. In addition, 
there is their economic hold over Latin American and 
European countries. 
Indonesia even tried to break up the EC block vote for the 
resolution by pulling on their economic ties. And they 
nearly succeeded. Britain, and later Germany, terrified of 
losing their lucrative arms deals with Indonesia, played a 
disgraceful role trying to bully the EC into accepting 
Indonesia's self-congratulatory statement. Showing itself as 
a state without any morals, the United Kingdom was guided 
only by politics and economics. 
Thanks to a strong statement by the Portuguese president 
warning of a break up of political cooperation in Europe 
should the EC not back the East Timorese resolution, 
together with a principled stance by Denmark, the UK and 
Germany could not afford to dissociate themselves from 
their EC partners. 
Key to the victory 
In the end all Indonesia's 'leading roles' and economic 
bullying could not bring them enough support. Indeed in 
those final days, the contrast between the calm and strength 
of the Portuguese delegation and Indonesia's frantic on-off 
negotiating, with reports of governments at home being 
threatened, induced states to take a position. 
The break up of the South vote was the key to the success 
of the East Timor Campaign at the UN this year. The anti-
western and anti-neo-colonial attitude of the southern 
nations was one of the politically most striking facts of the 
Commission. This was most bluntly stated by Iran who said 
that Portugal's only interest in East Timor was colonialist in 
intent. This argument was used to greatest effect in block-
ing a resolution on human rights abuse in China. In pres-
enting a motion that the Commission should take no action 
on the situation in China, the ten southern states who spoke 
described the western sponsors as hegemonists. 
First defeat 
Riding on China's back, Indonesia tried to pull off the same 
much criticised tactic. Malaysia, Indonesia's Asian ally, 
presented a no-action motion. But here the break up in the 
southern block became apparent. 
Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Costa Rica opposed the 
motion. Together with the other southern co-sponsors of 
the resolution (Brazil and Mozambique) it was clear that 
Indonesia was wrong to rely on a united southern backup. 
Even Pakistan, Tunisia and Mauritania abstained. The no-
action motion was defeated by 22 votes to 15, with 12 
abstentions. 
Final victory! 
The East Timorese had won once the motion of no-action 
had been defeated. The Commission, with 53 member 
governments entitled to vote, supported the resolution by 22 
votes to 12, with 15 abstentions. The votes in favour 
increased to 23 the next day when the absent Uruguay 
requested that its vote be registered. 
The co-sponsors of the resolution, not all of whom are 
voting members of the Commission, also increased to 24 at 
the last minute, with Canada adding its support along with 
the United States. Among Islamic states, Libya did not e~~n 
bother to tum up for the vote while Pakistan and Tums1a 
abstained. Japan and Mauritania (a NAM member) ~]so 
abstained. (Japan had voted in favour of the no-action 
motion.) 
Surprises for East Timor 
The decision by the United States to support and even co-
sponsor the East Timor resolution marks a major turning 
point for the campaign. In the past, the US State Depart-
ment has never followed Congress in taking a positive stand 
on East Timor. At the commission, in 1983, the US voted 
against a resolution on East Timor. 
Two East Timorese petitioners: Abe Baretto (left) and Constan-
cio Pinto. 
The tum-around in the stand of the Clinton administration 
marks a positive step in US fm;eign policy and shows that 
the Clinton administration's claims to put human rights at 
the top of the agenda may have some substance. 
Even more startling was the support from Australia. 
Australia regards East Timor as integrated with Indonesia 
both de jure and de facto. They even have a oil treaty with 
Indonesia to exploit East Timor's oil. From the beginning of 
the Commission, the delegation had shown its clear intent 
to vote against any resolution on East Timor. 
Yet they voted with the people of East Timor. Australian 
friends saw this as a "goodbye kiss to East Timor" from 
Gareth Evans, since Labour seemed certain to lose the 
Australian elections in March, leaving the conservatives to 
deal with the policy anomaly. In fact Labour won and they 
are now trying to backtrack on their stand by saying that it 
was only the inflexibility of the Indonesians which forced 
them to vote with East Timor. 
Japan was another unexpected decision. While voting in 
favour of no action, the delegation stressed over and over 
how difficult the decision was. When they abstained on the 
resolution it became clear that this country, with huge 
economic links with Indonesia, allowed their concern about 
human rights to override their economic interests. 
It is unclear whether the same is true for Pakistan. In 
voting trends, they always vote in the opposite lobby to 
India which invariably supports Indonesia. 
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Future implications 
In Indonesia, there are implications in the short and medium 
term. The hardline approach sponsored by the military 
failed and has led to defeat for Indonesia in front of the 
world. The embarrassment of not being able to silence a 
tiny nation of people, after 17 years, may well be blamed 
on the inflexibility imposed on the delegation in Geneva by 
the military. 
Responses in Jakarta following the UN defeat point to a 
major row between the foreign ministry and the army over 
who is responsible for the debacle. Although Ali Alatas has 
kept his portfolio in Suharto's new cabinet and several 
generals have lost theirs, the army still calls the shots in 
East Timor. This means that the hardliners may continue to 
enforce their will when talks between Indonesia and 
Portugal on the question of East Timor resume in Rome on 
20 April. 
However, the press in Indonesia have had extensive 
reports on the outcome of the Commission. An article in the 
Jakarta Post, which led with the headline "Indonesia 
defeated", reflects a growing concern within Indonesia for 
the situation of the Timorese people and the role of their 
government in perpetrating the crimes against humanity in 
that territory. This awareness among Indonesian people, 
which has increased dramatically since the massacre in Dili, 
is taking on more and more of a role in forcing the regime 
to allow a just and satisfactory outcome to the East Tim-
orese struggle. * 
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East Timorese at the UN 
East Timorese eye witnesses of the human rights atrocities in their home spoke before the Commission 
this year. Their testimonies were appalling and deeply moving. Here are excerpts of their stories. 
"I was arrested on 25th January 1991 at 9.30am, I was 
beaten for over 14 hours until blood came from my mouth, 
my nose, my eyes and my ears," Constancio Pinto told the 
UN. Constancio came to Portugal last November, having 
been in hiding since before the Massacre, to speak out 
about the plight of his fellow Timorese. 
Extermination of the youth 
The Commission heard Constancia's story and the stories of 
scores of other prisoners, and could not help but be shocked 
by the horrific torture perpetrated by Indonesian security 
forces. 
"The military commander of East Timor, Theo Syafei, 
continues to use "operasi Tuntas" (operation thoroughness 
or operation once and for all)", Constancio told the Com-
mission. "The victims of this operation are and will con-
tinue to be the young Timorese people. Hence, the exter-
mination of the Timorese youth will be the extermination 
of the next generation of Timorese people." 
Fifteen years in jail 
A Timorese imprisoned by the Indonesian authorities for 15 
years came to testify to the Commission. Domingos Seixas, 
a nurse with no political affiliations, was finally arrested on 
14 December 1982 after years of intimidation. "There were 
180 of us then in the Dili District Prison, all suspected of 
belonging to clandestine resistance groups," Domingos said. 
"I was tortured: beaten with rifle butts, beaten with iron 
bars, burned with cigarettes, given electric shocks .. . 
"One day, while I was being interrogated, I asked for a 
drink of water. They gave me a liquid which burnt my 
mouth, and then they poured the rest of it over my head. 
Once, at about 2 in the morning, men from the secret 
service (Kotis) took me down to the dock at Motael, tied a 
large stone around my neck and then threw me into the sea. 
The stone worked loose, I surfaced and was recaptured." 
The authorities claimed that Domingos and his col-
leagues had met resistance leaders Mauk Moruk and 
Xanana Gusmao. "This was untrue. I was sentenced to 15 
years imprisonment," Domingos told the Commission. 
Domingos was moved to Cipinang Prison in Jakarta where 
he "discovered that the East Timorese were not the only 
victims of this persecution. There, we found political 
prisoners from West Papua, from North Sumatra, and from 
Java itself." 
"Pulling a scab off an old wound" 
Abe Barreto Soares spent five years at university in Java 
and then, while on a study tour in Canada, decided to stay 
and speak out about the atrocities in his country. 
"Talking about human rights abuse in East Timor is like 
'pulling a scab off an old wound'. For any East Timorese 
like me who experienced the brutal invasion and occupation 
of their country by the Indonesian military, it is hard to 
make a decision to choose between speaking out or not 
speaking out about human rights abuse in East Timor. I 
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chose the latter and so I am here free to talk about my 
experience." He spoke about one incident which remains 
clearly in his memory. "One afternoon as I was playing 
football with my friends in the street, I saw an army truck 
drive past full of Hansip soldiers (army-trained militia). 
The men were shouting and singing and holding high, so 
that everyone could see, the severed heads of several 
guerrillas. This was meant as a warning to all of us not to 
support the resistance." 
Fears for family 
"Even though I am free to speak out about conditions in 
East Timor since the invasion in 1975, I feel rather scared 
as it might cause trouble to my family back home: my 
family could be harassed by the Indonesian military ... but 
that is a risk that I have to face," Abe said. 
This sentiment expressed by alJ three East Timorese is a 
reality. Constancio's wife has been harassed by the auth-
orities since he "disappeared". Recent reports say that Jose 
Ramos Horta's sister-in-law has been interrogated. 
Timorese women cry out 
Alexandra Reis, a Timorese student who has been living in 
Portugal since the invasion, spoke for East Timorese 
women who recently sent out a statement about violations 
of women by the Indonesian forces of occupation. 
"They have experienced many sufferings because their 
husbands are arrested and tortured sadistically and members 
of their families 'disappear' on their way home. But they 
spoke also of the atrocities committed against the women 
themselves." 
Alexandra called on the Commission to carry out an 
"exhaustive investigation about human rights violations in 
East Timor and to pay special attention to the sufferings of 
our womenfolk, especially the atrocity of rape. The power 
of Alexandra's speech was heightened by her joining with 
Siswa Santoso, an Indonesian activist living in Holland, 
who spoke about the climate of terror in Indonesia, refer-
ring specifically to the recent arrests at Blangguan (see 
article). 
Indonesian response . 
Commission members were clearly moved by these testi-
monies. So powerful were they, the Indonesian delegation 
tried to smear the statements through their puppet Timorese 
delegates. In their right of reply they referre~ to D~?1ingos 
as someone "who claimed to be an East Tllllorese . Such 
invidious attacks held no sway with the Commission, who 
later expressed their concern with a resounding vote in 
favour of the resolution. ~ 
Some of the petitioners who contributed to the victory in Geneva. 
Standing (left to righf): Constancio Pinto (East Timor), Carmel 
Budiardjo (UK), Siswa Sllntoso (Indonesia), Shahbuddin A. Rauf 
(Aceh) and Nelson Sllntos (East Timor). Sitting: Domingos 
Seixas (East Timor). 
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UN Resolution on East Timor 
The resolution was brought before the Commission by 24 sponsors: Angola, Belgium*, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Canada, Denmark*, Finland, France, Germany, Greece*, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland*, Ireland*, 
Italy*, Liechenstein*, Luxembourg*, Mozambique*, Netherlands, Norway*, Portugal, Spain*, Sweden*, 
Switzerland*, United Kingdom and United States of America. [*states not members of the Commission 
and therefore cannot vote). 
The Commission on Human Rights, guided by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenants on Human Rights and the universally accepted 
rules of international law, 
Bearing in mind the statement on the situation of human 
rights in East Timor as agreed by consensus by the 
Commission on Human Rights at its forty-eighth session 
(see E/CN.4/1992/84 para.457) following the violent 
incident of 12 November 1991 in Dili, 
Recalling the resolution 1992/20 of 27 August 1992 of 
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, 
Gravely concerned at the continuing allegations of 
serious human rights violations and noting with concern in 
this context the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the 
question of torture (E/CN.4/1993/26), of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions (E/CN.4/1993/26) and of the Working Group on 
enforced or involuntary disappearances (E/CN/1993/25); 
Bearing in mind the Body of Principles for the Protection 
of All Persons under . Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment approved by the General Assembly in its 
Resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988 and the Principles 
on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra Legal 
and Arbitrary and Summary executions, endorsed by the 
General Assembly in its resolution 44/162 of 15 December 
1989, 
Taking note of the information that the Government of 
Indonesia has provided to the Commission on its actions it 
has taken since during the past year, 
Welcoming the recent access to East Timor to human 
rights organisations as to some other relevant human rights 
observers, but remaining disappointed that such access is 
still frequently denied, 
Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on 
the situation in East Timor (E/CN.4/1993/49), 
1. Expresses its deep concern at the reports of continuing 
human rights violations in the territory of East Timor; 
2. Recalls that the Commission has commended the 
decision of the Government of Indonesia to set up an 
inquiry Commission but regrets that the Indonesian 
investigation into the actions of the members of its security 
personnel on 12 November 1991, from which resulted loss 
of life, injuries and disappearances, failed to clearly identify 
all those responsible for those actions; 
3. Expresses its concern at the lack of clear information 
about the number of people killed on 12 November 1991 
and at the persons still unaccounted for and urges the 
Government of Indonesia to account fully for those still 
missing since 12 November 1991; 
4. Regrets the disparity in the severity of sentences 
imposed on those civilians not indicted for violent activities 
- who should have been released without delay - on the 
one hand, and to the military involved in the violent 
incident, on the other; 
5. Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to honour 
fully its commitments undertaken in the statement on the 
situation of human rights in East Timor, agreed by 
consensus by the Commission on Human Rights at its 48th 
session; 
6. Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to ensure that 
all the East Timorese in custody, including main public 
figures, be treated humanely and with their rights fully 
respected, that all trials be fair, just, public and recognise 
the right to proper legal repre~ntation, in accordance with 
international humanitarian law, and that those not involv.ed 
in violent activities will be released without delay; 
7. Welcomes the greater access recently granted by the 
Indonesian authorities to human rights organisations and 
additional humanitarian organisations and calls upon the 
Indonesian government to expand this further; 
8. Encourages once again the Indonesian authorities to 
take the necessary steps to implement the recommendations 
presented by the Special Rapporteur on torture in its report 
(Doc. EiC. 4/1992/17/Add.l) following his visit to 
Indonesia and East Timor and to keep the Special 
Rapporteur informed of the progress made towards their 
implementation; 
9. Urges the Government of Indonesia to invite the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, the Special Rapporteur on 
extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances . to visit 
East Timor and to facilitate the discharge of their mandates; 
10. Welcomes the agreement given by the Government of 
Indonesia to the proposal of the Secretary-General for a 
new visit to Indonesia and East Timor by his personal 
envoy in the coming months, and invites the 
Secretary-General to consider transmitting the full report of 
Mr. Wako's previous and next visit to the Commission on 
Human Rights; 
11. Also welcomes the resumption of talks about the 
question of East Timor and encourages the 
Secretary-General to continue his good offices for 
achieving a just, comprehensive and internationally 
acceptable settlement of the question of East Timor; 
12. Decides to consider the situation in East Timor at its 
fiftieth session on the ·basis of the reports of the Special 
rapporteurs and Working Groups and that of the Secretary-
General, which would include an analytical compilation of 
all information received from, inter alia, Governments, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. "if 
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EAST TIMOR TRIALS" ..
---------
The trial of Xanana Gusmao 
Jn violation of international humanitarian law, the East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, 
has been on trial in Dili since 1 February, facing charges of rebellion and undermining national 
stability which carry a possible life sentence, and of being in illegal possession of firearms, which 
could incur the death sentence. 
For reasons best known to themselves, the regime decided 
not to charge Xanana under the anti-subversion Jaw 
although East Timorese tried last year for participating in 
demonstrations in Dili and Jakarta received harsh sentences, 
including life imprisonment, on anti-subversion charges. 
Defence counsel 
Xanana is being defended by a Jakarta-based lawyer, 
Sudjono, whose appointment was clearly foisted on him by 
the authorities. The Legal Aid lnstitute (LBH), which 
bandied most of the East Timorese trials in 1992, offered to 
defend him but sources in Jakarta say that when Xanana 
was held at the Jakarta police headquarters, the police 
prevented communication between him and the LBH. 
By contrast, Sudjono has good connections . with the 
police. He was aUowed to meet Xanana in police custody 
several times, eventually convincing him to let him handle 
the case. Sudjono's conduct during the trial suggests that he 
looks upon this high-profile trial as a useful boost to his 
career. Speaking frequently outside the courtroom, he has 
expressed confidence that he will win a low sentence for 
the defendant by pursuing a non-confrontational strategy. 
He claims that this strategy secured a sentence of ten 
months for Agapito Cardoso, the East Timorese whom he 
defended in Jakarta last year. Other human rights lawyers 
in Jakarta, however, are privately Jess complimentary about 
the way be handled the Agapito trial. 
It is obvious that Sudjono and Xanana are not foJlowing 
an agreed line. It is not even certain that they fully under-
stand each other as they can communicate only in English, 
a language which neither speaks very well. Responding to 
testimony from prosecution witnesses, Xanana has con-
firmed almost everything they have said, concurring with 
claims that he himself led actions against Indonesian troops 
and taking responsibility for everything reportedly done by 
his troops. After one hearing when Xanana accepted 
responsibility for killing Indonesian troops, Sudjono who 
was clearly exasperated, said he could not understand 
Xanana's position and would consider his own representa-
tions a success if his client escaped execution and received 
life imprisonment on the charges he faces. [The Age, 
17.11.1993] 
Court's competence challenged 
Sudjono's first initiative was to challenge the court's 
competence to try the defendant. After the charges had been 
laid, he argued that the court has no jurisdiction in the 
territory. "My argument is that de facto East Timor is part 
of Indonesia but de jure it is not yet. The United Nations is 
still questioning this problem.... From the beginning, the 
Indonesian government was not recognised in the former 
Portuguese colony. Therefore all the institutions there do 
not exist." [Reuter and The Times, 4.II.1993J Sudjono also 
challenged the prosecutor's indictment for laying charges 
against Xanana as from 17 July 1976 (the date when 
. . 
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Indonesia formally annexed the territory), whereas Xanana 
was engaged· in his activities against Indonesia long before 
then. 
The court rejected the challenge and declared itself to be 
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competent to try the resistance leader. 
Prosecution witnesses 
Before the trial, the prosecution said it would summon 
thirty witnesses. Some of the witnesses are captured 
~errillas and other East Timorese now in captivity who, by 
nghts could well be summoned as defence witnesses. The 
defence lawyer however has no access to any prisoners 
other than the defendant and is not in a position to consider 
their suitability as defence witnesses. The very fact that a 
'prosecution witness' used his appearance to condemn 
Indonesia shows how farcical the proceedings are . 
. Defe~ce lawye~ Sudjono has complained that it is proving 
1D1poss1ble for hlDl to call witnesses for the defence. Two 
men who fought under Xanana told him they were "to 
scared" to appear on his behalf. Sudjono also said he 
wanted Abilio Soares, East Tim or's governor, to appear as 
a witness, apparently to testify that he knew Xanana when 
they were at school together. Sudjono should have known 
better. Soares replied that he had no intention of doing 
anything "to help a rebel". , 
Another of Sudjono's initiatives -was to approach Jose 
Ramos Horta with a request that he appear in court as a 
witness. Horta wrote to Sudjono reiterating that Indonesia 
has no jurisdiction to hold such a trial which is illegal 
under interational law; he was nevertheless "ready to travel 
to my homeland, East Timor (to help) you prove beyond 
doubt that Xanana Gusmao and all our compatriots... have 
not violated any laws of any country." 
Reports in . the Indonesian press later twisted things, 
alleging falsely that the initiative to testify had come from 
Horta himself. Quotes allegedly from Sudjono to this effect 
are difficult to assess. Did he deliberately set a trap for 
Horta or was he being maliciously misquoted? Co~idering 
the way the press is manipulated in Indonesia, the latter 
could well be true. 
Xanana in court 
The appearance of Xanana Gusmao in court has attracted a 
large number of East Timorese. Security around the 
courthouse has been strict and everyone attending a hearing 
is required to have a special form of identification. Many 
people were only able to follow the proceedings outside. 
Xanana's father and mother have attended all the hearings, 
along with his youngest sister, Filomena. 
For the first few hearings, six Portuguese journalists were 
in Dili to attend the hearings. They were not allowed to be 
present however when witnesses began to appear. Several 
Australian journalists have also been in Dili to follow the 
trial. Some embassies in Jakarta, including the US and 
Australian embassies as well as one of the EC embassies, 
have also sent diplomats to Dili for the trial. The Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists was given permission to send 
a jurist but he was only granted a six-day visa and prob-
ably did not attend more than a single hearing. 
A request by Amnesty International for its representative, 
Geoffrey Robinson, who was in Jakarta at the end of 
January for the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Workshop, to 
proceed to Dili and observe the trial, was rejected. The 
authorities flatly refused to extend his five-day visa. 
Xanana himself has been very reluctant to speak to 
anyone and appears to be under strict orders not to 
approach anyone at all. At his first appearance in court, 
when asked his nationality, Xanana baffled everyone by 
telling the court that he was 'Indonesian'. As he was 
entering the court for the second hearing, he suddenly 
E4~1' TIMOR TRIALS 
turned to the journalists outside and said, in English, 
"Please stay on till the end." This has raised expectations 
that he intends to make his stand clear on all the issues 
connected with his capture and trial when he presents his 
defence statement in court at the end of the trial. This is 
unlikely to happen until late March or early April. 
Xanana Gusmao entering the District Courl. 
When he appeared at the third hearing, it was clear that 
this gesture had caused him trouble. He kept his face turned 
away from journalists and covered it with the papers he was 
carrying, to avoid eye contact. 
Subsequently, observers say, he has been more relaxed, 
closely following the proceedings and taking extensive 
notes. He has rarely acknowledged the presence of his 
parents and sister, but on the one occasion when he did turn 
to si;iiile at thei;ii, blowing them a kiss, the presiding-judge 
repr1D1anded hlDl for 'misbehaving'. His sister later angrily 
condemned the judge: "Fancy telling him off for smiling at 
his parents," she said, sobbing. 
Testimony of the witnesses 
Several of the witnesses are Indonesian soldiers whose task 
has b.e~n to tel! the c~urt about guerrilla actions and alleged 
at!oc1ttes aga~st villagers. Several, including an East 
Timorese soldier, were summoned to describe the assault on 
the house in Dili where Xanana was captured and the 
fire~s allegedly ~ound in his possession. The charge 
ab.out illegal poss~ssrnn of firearms is apparently based on 
thts. The East T1D1orese soldier, Corporal Joao Jesus da 
Costa was the first witness to be called; his involvement in 
the capture of Xanana is being deliberately highlighted. 
Two former guerrillas summoned as witnesses told th~ 
court that although, after their capture, they had been forced 
to help the Indonesian troops in their search for guerrilla 
bases, they had never ceased to work for the resistance 
Mariano da Silva, 43 years, said that after his capture ~ 
1987, ~e began to work as a courier and guide for 
Indonesian troops on operation. "But I continued to function 
as .a couri~r, keeping contact between Xanana and the 
re~1stance m the towns. When I went out into the forest 
with m1em~e~s of the armed forces, I always concealed Xanana s htdmg places. I pretending to be working for the 
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Indonesians but I still worked for Xanana and kept him 
informed of ABRI presence in Dili and Ainaro." (Suara 
Pembaruan, 26.II.1993] 
Indonesian press reporting of witnesses' testimony is 
clearly manipulated and very incomplete. One has to tum 
to a report in Melbourne's The Age to learn for instance that 
another former guerrilla, Antonio Campos was prevented 
from continuing by the presiding-judge when he started 
talking about beatings by Indonesian troops. Later, asked by 
a judge whether he had seen guerrillas kill villagers "in a 
cruel and sadistic way", he replied, "Yes." When asked, 
"And who would those people have been?" he replied: 
"Spies." He also told the court that Xanana had ordered the 
death sentence for any guerrilla who raped villagers. 
Farcical use of Saturnino 'testimony' 
At a hearing on 11 March, the judge announced that one of 
the witnesses Satumino da Costa Belo, who was to have 
appeared on' that day, was 'too mentally distu~b~d' to 
appear. The prosecution was therefore given perm1SS1on to 
read out the 'verbatim report' of his interrogation. This is an 
outrageous abuse. When Satumino appeared in court a week 
earlier, he used the opportunity to shout pro-independence 
slogans, clearly signalling that he did not want to testify. 
The document read out has him 'testifying' about alleged 
attacks by guerrilla units in Baucau in 1984 when villagers 
Continued on page 20 
The true aim of territorial operations 
The military commander of East Timor, Brig. Gen. Theo Syafei, claims that Indonesian troops in East 
Timor are being reduced to eight territorial and two local battalions, a total of 6, 000 men, while 
western military analysts believe the number of troops there is twice that. Syafei hopes to defuse 
worldwide concern about human rights in East Timor. But he has recently explained that his territorial 
troops are doing much more than building roads and bridges. 
In an article entitled "Building a new civilisation", Syafei's 
views on creating a totally new social structure at the base 
of East Timorese society are set out. As he sees it, the role 
of the army in the project is pivotal. 
Syafei says that the "civil war" which, he alleges, 
occurred before East Timor was incorporated into Indonesia 
and cost one hundred thousand lives {his figure), resulted in 
the total destruction of indigenous social structures. This 
has made it extremely difficult for government institutions 
to function at the lowest levels of society. "Structures such 
as the RT/RW [residential units] and LKMD [village social 
organs] exist on paper but are not linked to any indigenous 
structures," he told Kompas.: {l~III.1993] 
1'aaJ,ia published this photo of the landing of Indonesian troops 
on 7 December in Dili: This is first time such a picture has ever 
appeared in the Indonesian press. 
What Syafei refers to as the "civil war" is of course, 
Indonesia's war of invasion and annexation from 1975 to 
1979, in which he personally fought for several years. 
Indigenous structures were indeed gravely damaged. Almost 
the entire population in the countryside was uprooted and 
forced to re-settle in areas designated by the army of 
occupation. This led not only to massive physical annihila-
tion - at least two hundred thousand deaths - but to a 
social trauma from which the people of East Timor have 
still not recovered. 
The trauma inflicted on East Timorese society was 
described at some length in a sociological survey produced 
by academics from Yogyakarta's Gajah Mada university, Jed 
by Dr Mubyarto. (See TAPOL Bulletin, No 99, June 1990] 
The study spoke about the 'trauma of war', the 'culture 
shock' suffered by the East Timorese as well as by the 
Catholic church and the 'overdose' of military presence not 
only in their physical presence but in their 'dominating role'. 
The Gadjah Mada team undertook its survey in early 1990. 
Since then, things in East Timor have got steadily worse 
following the Santa Cruz massacre, the appointment of 
Theo Syafei and the fiercer-than-ever clampdown on alJ 
forms of resistance to Indonesian rule. 
Territorial operations and village society 
It has become an integral part of Syafei's policy of control 
to undermine the role of the church and its priests who 
today are the only remaining buffer to protect the popula-
tion from the depravities of the army. Syafei is now bent on 
using his troops to impose a new set of social structures and 
a new value system on the entire population. He complains 
about the absence of a network of organs of authority 
through which the people's loyalties can flow. The fact is, 
according to Syafei, that people's participation in any kind 
of activity can occur only if ABRI brings it about. Thus, 
whenever ~ community needs some organ of authority 
through which to channel its loyalties, the only option is 
ABRI. All leaders, from Governor Abilio Soares down, 
according to the military commander, agree that the army's 
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territorial operations are still needed. The aim of these 
territorial operations, said Pak Theo, is to close the gap 
between the new social values and society's aspirations. 
Come what may, East Timorese society must be guided 
towards a new village culture, bringing it in line with other 
parts of Indonesia. This process is needed to fill the gaps 
and cracks in social and political life. 
The project Syafei envisages entails the constant presence 
of Indonesian troops and their assertion of control in all 
centres of population. But can he and his jack-booted 
assassins succeed? It was Bishop Belo, head of East Timor's 
Catholic church, who said recently, when asked whether 
Xanana Gusmao's capture would end the people's resistance: 
"I don't believe so. Xanana is only a man. The armed 
resistance can end but the psychology and cultural resis-
tance of the people will continue. As long as the people 
exist, resistance will continue. They have their own identity, 
their own legends, traditions and way of life." [The Age, 
13.II.1993] 
Syafei on Indonesia's war 
Brig.Gen. Syafei has also begun to contradict Indonesia's 
official version of how it gained control of East Timor. He 
is in effect re-writing the official history of annexation 
according to which there was no invasion and no war, only 
'Indonesian volunteers' who helped anti-Fretilin parties in 
their 'civil war' with Fretilin. 
Syafei told Indonesian journalists who visited East Timor 
in January this year: "Initially, ABRI had to ""cope with 
Fretilin which possessed 17,000 weapons. From 1975 to 
1977-78, territorial operations were focused on seizing 
control of the district and sub-district towns from Fretilin's 
'stranglehold'. As a result, the rebels were pushed back, 
forcing them to flee to the hills or the villages in the 
interior. From 1978-80, ABRI had seized villages 'control-
led' by Fretilin while in 1981-83, territorial operations were 
charged with wiping out the remnant forces of Fretilin." 
[Kedaulatan Rakyat, 26.II.1993] 
Why has Syafei started putting the record straight on 
Indonesia's war? Officers like him who have spent many 
years fighting in East Timor feel that their warlike feats 
have gone too long unrewarded. Secrecy surrounds the war 
and the army's dead and wounded are unsung heroes. But 
more than that, officers like Syafei are now demanding a 
say in resolving the question of East Timor internationally. 
This will rest on their claim to have fought and won a war 
of conquest. {( 
Indonesia shaken by events in Geneva 
The Indonesian regime has clearly been shaken by the 
numerous statements made in Geneva condemning the 
human rights situation in East Timor and by the defeat it 
suffered at. the hands of the UN Human Rights Commis-
sion. As the Commission meeting was drawing to a close 
in Geneva, several 'East Timorese collaborators gave voice 
to the regime's irritation by complaining especially at the 
harsh words directed against Indonesia by the .. EC Twelve 
in their statement under Item 12 of the agenda. They 
directed their ire at Denmark (which holds the EC presi-
dency) whose diplomat read out the statement, but also 
attacked Canada and Finland for criticising Indonesia along 
similar lines. 
These remarks were made before the Commission adopted 
its resolution when Jakarta still was assuming that the 
resolution would be defeated. 
An East Timorese member of the DPR, Salvadore Xime-
nes Soares, who was in Geneva, criticised the Twelve for 
failing to acknowledge Indonesia's efforts to conform with 
the Commission's Consensus Statement last year, requiring 
Indonesia to allow international human rights organisations 
to visit East Timor. "Did we not aJJow Portuguese journal-
ists to attend the Xanana trial and allow an Amnesty 
representative to attend the UN workshop in Jakarta?" [In 
fact, the journalists were only allowed to attend the opening 
sessions of the trial whilst Al's Geoff Robinson was denied 
permission to go to Dili for the trial.] Soares also accused 
Portugal of "dramatising" things by repeating the "claim" 
that 200,000 East Timorese have died. He was pleased to 
note that the US had not joined in this chorus of anti-
Indonesian abuse (though the US delegation in Geneva 
voted in favour of the resolution). 
He claimed that people attending the Commission were 
"very impressed" by the presence of five East Timorese 
who spoke up for Indonesia and "refuted" all kinds of 
attackS coming from a number of non-governmental 
organisations. It was important in future for elements 
representing East Timorese society to attend UN meetings 
so as to contradict these "anti-Indonesian elements". 
[Perhaps he believes that accredited NGOs with the right to 
speak at the Commission will be willµig to give the floor to 
Indonesian collaborators. The problem for him and his 
friends is that their only opening in Oeneva is as part of the 
official Indonesian mission.] 
Was it not striking, he went on, that an East Timorese 
named . Leonardo dos Reis had taken his place as a member · 
of the Indonesian diplomatic corps and was now a third 
secretary at the Indonesian mission in Geneva? 
Soares also assailed NGO representatives who spoke on 
behalf of the OPM and the Aceh Liberation Front and made 
"ridiculous allegations" against Indonesia. It was, he said, 
infuriating that these stupid charges should find a platform 
in that highly-respected UN forum. 
Soares claimed that agreement had been reached that 
another consensus statement would be adopted at this year's 
Commission. Unfortunately for him, he was speaking on the 
very day that the consensus statement was thrown out and 
the Commission voted on its strongly-worded resolution. 
[Indonesian Observer, 10.III.93 and Suara Karya, 11.III.93) 
As for the puppet governor, Abilio Soares, he alleged that 
the NGOs who criticise Indonesia on these international 
forums where doing so to "earn money" for their activities. 
"They want to drive Indonesia into a comer on the interna-
tional arena and do so by distorting the facts," he said. 
For him the ultimate proof that human rights are respected 
in East Timor was the trial of Xanana Gusmao. "As a war 
criminal, Xanana should by rights not have been tried at all 
but immediately punished." [Jawa Pos, 10.III.93] [This is 
indeed what has happened to very large numbers of East 
Timorese who have 'disappeared' or been the victims of 
extra-judicial killings.] * 
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Suharto and ABRI 
The appointment of General Try Sutrisno as vice-president was not as smooth as it may have seemed. 
In an unprecedented move, General Try Sutrisno was nominated by ABRI, confronting Suharto with 
a fait accompli and leaving him little room for manoeuvre. But Suharto took up the gauntlet and 
emerged on top, for the time being at least. 
Most commentators argue that President Suharto is the only 
ruthless and shrewd politician around; all the others, 
including the ABRI top-brass are macan kertas (paper 
tigers). Politics in Suharto's Indonesia has never been very 
exciting; everything is stage-managed and predictable. In 
the words of the London Economist: "Redundant Kremlin -
ologists should consider a move to Jakarta. Indonesia's 
politics presents a smooth, indeed monotonous surface" 
[Economist, 13.III.1993]. Most real politics happen below 
the surface in the informal circuit. 
Try Sutrisno versus Habibie 
ABRI's nomination of General Try was therefore a rare 
moment of excitement. Never before under Suharto's rule 
has ABRI dared push anyone up front. This time, the risk 
of Suharto appointing his favourite minister B.J. Habibie as 
vice- president was simply to great. Cilangkap (the armed 
forces HQ) had to move fast to prevent it. 
Rivalry between Habibie and Cilangkap has loomed large; 
it is primarily over who controls arms purchases. Habibie, 
the high-tech czar, is in charge of Indonesia's military 
industrial complex and has taken charge of practically all 
arms purchases from the US, the UK, Germany and France. 
Arms deals involve huge amounts of cash, both above-
board and under the table. The Cilangkap top-brass has had 
to swaJlow the fact that Habibie, a civilian, has made the 
juicy deals with British Aerospace, General Electric and 
other companies. Last year Cilangkap struck back and many 
arms negotiations such as the Hawks deal are now in the 
hands of the air force command. 
The other source of irritation is Habibie's emergence as 
leader of ICM/, the organisation of Muslim intellectuals 
established two years ago. ICM/ has rapidly become a 
power- house in Jakarta's stale-mated world of politics. 
Suharto's flirtation with [slam boils down basicaIIy to a 
flirtation with ICM!, just one of the many Muslim 
organisations. ICM/ leaders include bureaucrats, technocrats 
and social activists, now the vanguard of Suharto loyalists 
known as ATS (Asal Tetap Suharto, 'Suharto must stay'). 
His opponents are known as the ABS gang (Asal Bukan 
Suharto, 'anybody but Suharto'). Suharto has rewarded ICM/ 
members by catapulting them into the new DPR and MPR 
assemblies. In February, Habibie withdrew from the race for 
vice-president, realising that ABRI meant business in 
promoting General Try. Try's candidacy was a certainty 
when all the other groups had jumped on the bandwagon. 
But ABRI's decision to promote Try Sutrisno meant 
kicking at an open door. Try wasABRI's top man and could 
not possibly be by-passed. From 1974-1978 he was 
Suharto's aide-de-camp. Suharto's children still fondly 
remember him as the young officer who used to play 
piggy-back with them. Had Try, as vice-president, been 
backed by a team of generals in the new cabinet, he could 
have voiced Cilangkap's views. But this did not happened 
as Suharto brought only one other Cilangkap stalwart into 
the cabinet, the new ABRI commander-in-chief, General 
Edi Sudradjat who has become Defence Minister. General 
Try Sutrisno is known as an officer with below average 
intelligence, otak lemah (weak brained) as some Indone-
sianists say. The new vice-president is no match for 
Suharto and will be at the mercy of his boss. 
Suharto, the master dalang 
The emergence of ICM/ has unsettled the political balance, 
meaning that a new balance was needed. ABRI's dissat-
isfaction has been transparent for some time as public 
statements by high-placed military have become more 
belJigerent. Suharto's (and Alatas') diplomatic efforts on 
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East Timor have been openly criticised and portrayed as an 
insult .to the nation. Some officers have publicly criticised 
the vast business affairs of the Suharto offspring. 
Suharto's personalised dictatorship has had to cope with 
this situation and as yet Suharto, always a pragmatist, has 
managed to weather the various political storms of the last 
27 years. The balance Suharto must now strike is between 
ICM/ and ABRI. Though ICM/ is well entrenched at the top 
of the bureaucracy it has no grass roots; ABRI is the only 
institution in Indonesia with its jackboots firmly implanted 
from Aceh to West Papua. The new faces in the cabinet 
reflect this new balance. Suharto struck back at ABRI by 
removing several top generals from the cabinet. 
Suharto and ABRI 
It is a public secret that Suharto's relationship with the 
Cilangkap general staff has plummeted. In particular since 
the mid-eighties, Suharto's economic policies have been 
allied to the bee-market technocrats and the burgeoning 
conglomerates. Statist 'economic policies of the seventies 
which were beneficial for the military were partly aban-
doned. Since then, Habibie's high-tech projects have 
absorbed huge state subsidies and a number of state cash-
crop plantations have been losing billions every year. 
The recent period, a period of deregulation has meant a 
boost for the free marketeers and a steady decline in 
military influence in politics and the economy. Suharto has 
increasingly relied on skills and know-how from a stream 
of young, dynamic and well-trained academics. Horizontal-
ly in the different ministries and vertically down to village-
heads, the non-military have forged ahead. The civilian 
careers of retired officers are not so secure as they used to 
be. Although key positions in the bureaucracy are still filled 
by retired officers, the main trend is the civilianisation of 
the bureaucracy. Indonesia watchers have wondered why 
the military allowed this to happen. This decline could not 
continue forever and already prior to the general elections 
of 1992 there were determined efforts by the military to 
reverse the process. 
ABRI back to the basics 
One of the central power structures in Indonesian politics is 
a huge and stodgy bureaucracy. After 1965,ABRI took over 
many positions in the bureaucracy by purging, arresting and 
executing alleged leftist civil servants. Overnight, sergeant-
majors became village heads and lieutenant-colonels took 
on top ministerial positions. The majority of this 1965 
generation have retired and have been replaced by civilians. 
The easiest way to pursue a career is to join the govern-
ment party GOLKAR and KORPRI, the civil servants' 
association. Proposals for provincial posts like subdistrict 
and village head are nowadays often channelled in this way. 
Although ABRI is the founding father of GOLKAR, its 
influence has been on the wane. Before the 1992 general 
elections, . Cilangkap designed a strategy to re-assert their 
influence. GOLKAR was the obvious choice and the local 
military moved to take over GOLKAR branches. ABRI 
fielded many candidates and succeeded in creating a new 
network of officers and NCOs in Civilian posts. 
Likewise, ABRI fielded candidates for provincial gov-
ernors; throughout 1992ABRI arm-twisted local assemblies 
to accept officers as provincial governors. Cilangkap was 
relatively successful, not least because ret'd General Rudini, 
as Home Minister, helped the process along. 
At the top, things are more tricky because Suharto has the 
final say. In a presidential system, cabinet ministers are 
assistants of the president and are appointed by him. 
Moreover Suharto is concurrently Supreme Commander of 
the armed forces which means he fills the top positions in 
Cilangkap. There is a serious bottleneck as several officers 
The two newly appointed four sta.r generals in the cabinet, Try 
Sutrisno and Edi Sudradjat, lonely at the top. 
have stuck to their posts. Army chief-of-staff General Edi 
Sudradjat stayed in the post for almost five years and now 
occupies the prestigious position of Minister of Defence and 
ABRI commander-in-chief. ·Chief of social and political 
affairs Lt. General Harsudiono Hartas has remained in the 
post for the same length of time. Suharto and Cilangkap 
have been at loggerheads about ABRI appointments and the 
announcement of the new cabinet has proven that Suharto 
is still determined to restrict ABRI influence at the top. 
He will not be pushed around 
The general assumption was that growing pressure from 
ABRI would ultimately bear fruit but Try's nomination 
proved counter-productive. There had been no consultation 
with Suharto and Major-General Moerdiono, the powerful 
State Secretary, warned that the president was upset and 
would not be pushed around. 
In the event, ABRI's presence in the cabinet has declined. 
The two powerful generals from the transitional generation 
(between the Suharto-generation and the AMN/Military 
Academy generation), Benny Murdani and Rudini have 
gone. Both were instrumental in streamlining the armed 
forces in 1983 and became key ministers in the cabinet. 
Both were expected to maintain positions in the new 
cabinet but were ditched. General Benny Murdani has been 
a Suharto stalwart for many years but in the last five years 
they have drifted apart. On most key issues Murdani now 
disagrees with Suharto's policies, in particular the Suharto-
Alatas policies regarding East Timor in the international 
arena. As for the high-profile Rudini, he has been too 
independent-minded for Suharto's liking. 
Cilangkap's position in the new cabinet is paltry. Besides 
General Edi Sudradjat the only generals are Major General 
Tiopan Bernard Silalahi as Minister of Administrative 
Reforms and Lt. General Ida Bagus Sudjana as Minister of 
Mining. Both left active service in the eighties and are not 
Cilangkap stalwarts. Sudjana became member of MPR in 
1986 and was appointed secretary-general of the Defence 
Ministry in October 1987. Major-General Silalahi became 
secretary-general of the Mining Department in June 1988. 
Lt.General Soegiarto, former Minister for Transmigration, 
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bas disappeared from the cabinet. 
From the old generation of ABRI officers, only one new 
name has appeared, ret'd Lt. GeneraJ Yogie S. Memet, a 
red-beret and former Governor of West Java who becomes 
Home Minister. Many reti.fed generals, Admiral Sudom~, 
Lt. General Sudharmono, Lt. General Ismael Saleh, Lt. 
General Bustanil Arifm and Lt. General Soepardjo Roestam 
have left the scene. The result is that Suharto's new cabinet 
has fewer generals than ever before and a much larger 
number of technocrats. -4' 
A morle nationalistic course 
Suharto s critics and supporters agree on one thing, Suharto's rule is typified by a strong emphasis on 
economic development. While critics say Suharto neglects the political, social and cultural aspects, his 
supporters hail the economic achievements of the New Order. Suharto s new cabinet, announced on 
17 March, again reflects a strong focus on the economy. 
The first thing that strikes one about the new cabinet is the 
disappearance of the RMS gang, the technocrats who have 
been in charge of fmance, trade and industry. Radius 
Prawiro (former Coordinating Minister for Economy, 
Finance and Industry), Adrianus Mooy (Governor of the 
Central Bank) and J.B. Sumarlin (Finance Minister) have all 
been replaced, along with Arifm Siregar, the former Trade 
Minister. The RMS gang is usuaJly seen as the offspring of 
the first generation of technocrats (also known as the 
Berkeley Mafia) who, in the late sixties, paved the way for 
the Indonesian economy to come into line with IMF and 
World Bank guidelines. The RMS gang is known for its 
adherence to free market principles and stood in the 
forefront of the "boom and bubble economy" of the 
eighties. They have been replaced by a younger generation 
Security officers arresting demonstrators in front of MPR 
building (see box). 
of technocrats, with a more nationalistic outlook and a 
preference for statist policies. The sole survivor of the 
Berkeley Mafia is Saleh Afflf who will lead the Indonesian 
delegation to the CGI, the consultative group of donor 
countries and agencies which meets annually in Paris. 
Suharto against the West? 
Some striking names of the new group in charge are: Saleh 
Affif, Coordinating Minister for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs, Hartarto, Coordinating Minister for Industry and 
Trade, Johnny Ginandjar Kartasasmita, the new Head of 
Bappenas, the State Planning Bureau, Sanyoto Sastrowar-
doyo, Minister for Investment (a new department), Finance 
Minister, Mar'ie Muhammad, Minister for Industry, Tungki 
Aribowo, Minister for Trade, Billy Yudono a,id Governor 
of the Central Bank, Sudradjat Djiwandono. There are some 
old faces, but the new boys, like their predecessors, mostly 
have had an academic training abroad. 
The sluggish Indonesian economy, partly due to the global 
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recession and falling world market prices, is causing great 
concern and the RMS gang failed to curb inflation which is 
still between 7..:.8%. Both foreign and domestic investments 
have dropped almost by half and the banking sector had a 
particularly bad year with the traumatic collapse of Bank 
Summa and mergers of other banks. The unbridled growth 
of the eighties has had serious.side effects and increasingly, 
state intervention has been needed to bail out companies 
with bad investments. Tommy Suharto's bad deals in the 
clove monopoly and Bambang Suharto's failure to acquire 
the orange monopoly are some of the more blatant 
examples where state banks had to step in by forking ouf 
huge sums of money. 
As the Holy Bible says, 7 lean years will follow 7 fat 
years. To bring the economy back on even keel, companies 
are screaming for state intervention (ie. state subsidies). 
Ginandjar Kartasasmita, the new Chief of Bappenas is a 
typical representative of the statist economy. He spent his 
early career in the top bureaucracy of Sekneg (the state 
secretariat) and in 1987 was promoted to Minister of 
Energy and Mining, directly involved with state revenues. 
Suharto's switch to a more statist kind of economy is in 
many ways understandable. The creation of the North 
American NAFf A trade block and the Europe of Maastricht 
are bad signs for an export-oriented economy like Indo-
nesia. Therefore Suharto is not in the position to show a 
strong fist against the IMF/World Bank although, with his 
new cabinet, he is giving a clear signal that a period of 
regulation is approaching. In his accountability speech to 
the MPR Suharto stressed the eradication of poverty, the 
creation of jobs and supplying the needs of the people. The 
gap between the haves and have-nots has grown and 
Suharto knows that state intervention is needed to cope with 
the inevitable social problems. 
The balance in the new cabinet 
This cabinet is most likely Suharto's last cabinet and in 
many ways it reflects his final days. The two power struct-
ures ICM/ and ABRI are represented in the cabinet but in a 
modest way. The ABRI ministers (see separate article) lack 
punch and the ICM/ ministers consist of technocntts. 
Suharto decided to keep the two cliques at arm's length 
outside the cabinet. Some of his closest associates have 
become ministers, the family-planning supremo Harjono 
Sujono was made Minister for Population and Family 
Planning and Sonny Harsono who headed the Land Bureau 
in Suharto's office has become Minister for Land Affairs, 
handling one of the most explosive issues in present-day 
Indonesia. With the removal of the RMS trio, three Chris-
tians, Suharto got rid of the accusation that the economic 
policies are designed by this minority. The new Christian 
face is Sudradjat Djiwandono, the new governor of Bank 
Indonesia. 
The cabinet is entirely a Suharto hand-picked cabinet full 
of colourless technocrats and bureaucrats. The majority are 
experts in their own field and none of them show any 
political ambition. Important issues like the succession and 
Suharto's conflict with ABRI have been left unresolved; it 
looks like the battle has just begun. )/... 
Acehnese refugees in Malaysia under threat 
Conditions of Acehnese refugees in prison in Malaysia 
continue to deteriorate according to a press release of the 
Acheh/Sumatra National Liberation Front on 8 February: 
Alor Star Prison, Kedah State 
Prisoners have been subjected to physical abuse causing 
injuries but refused medical treatment. Food is mixed with 
grit causing intestinal bleeding. They are told return to 
Indonesia is their best option. On 17 January, they mounted 
a protest, refusing to return to their cells in the evening. 
Nothing has been heard about conditions since then. 
Taiping Prison, Perak State 
Living conditions are much the same as in Alor Star. The 
prisoners were recently told that a court would decide 
whether they were political refugees or illegal immigrants 
which could mean refoulement. With no legal aid, they fear 
they will not be able to argue their case. International 
observers should attend the proceedings. 
Juru Prison, Penang 
Prisoners' spokesman Sulaiman Ismail was removed from 
here in December, since when conditions have worsened. 
Food is meagre and children are suffering the most. They 
have been warned of transfer to an unknown location. 
Penang Police dungeon 
Conditions have not improved. Malaysian Police special 
branch chief, Datok Zulkitli, visited the 12 men there and 
told them: "We regard you as illegal immigrants, with 
no possibility of political asylum here. You have no 
alternative but to return to Indonesia." He would not 
concede to a request that they be allowed to go to the 
UNHCR office or to a third country for asylum. 
Aceh situation raised in Geneva 
An Acehnese activist, Syahbuddin, told the UN Human 
Rights Commission meeting in Geneva that fear still stalks 
the land with villagers dreading the midnight knock on the 
door followed by torture and in many cases 'disappearance'. 
Torture is commonplace, he said. When victims are killed, 
the bodies are left lying in the street as a warning to others. 
He spoke of rape which is being used as a military 
strategy to demoralised and intimidate villagers. His aunt 
suffered this indignity when troops came to arrest her 
husband. He escaped but she was captured and held for four 
days and nights during which time she was repeatedly rape. 
He warned that transmigration of Javanese to Aceh means 
Javanisation and ethnic cleansing. 
Transmigration to resume 
Transmigration of Javanese to Aceh will soon resume after 
years of standstill because of "security disturbances", said 
Aceh's governor, Ibrahim Hasan. Many transmigrants had 
been moved to safer areas or had returned to Java. "Now," 
he said, "Aceh has been designated a priority area for 
transmigrants" and alleged that development there would be 
"impossible" without them. [Jakarta Post, 4.///.1993] )/... 
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Discrimination against the Chine_se min~rity 
With the ban on the Chinese New Year celebrations in Central Java this year, discrimination against 
the Chinese minority in Indonesia has come into the open. Discrimination against ethnic Chinese has 
been latent since the birth of the Republic, with waves of pogroms against them. Rapid economic 
growth in the Asia - Pacific region and the growth in Chinese business interests have exacerbated anti-
Chinese sentiments. The restoration of diplomatic relations with China has further increased animosity. 
On 15 January this year, the Governor of Central Java, Lt. 
General Ismail (ret'd), announced the ban on public 
celebrations for the Chinese New Year "to prevent charges 
of exclusiveness or racism" and "to speed up the process of 
integration of the Chinese ethnics and the native people in 
the region". The erection of posters and banners with New 
Year salutations was also prohibited. 
AlJ the mayors and district heads in the Central Java 
province were instructed to implement the rule and, one 
week later, the ban was extended by the Director-General 
of the Department for Religious Affairs to a ban on any 
celebration of the event in Buddhist temples. Those who 
went to temple on Chinese New Year's day were questioned 
and registered by the authorities. 
InPres no. 14/1967 
The ban on celebrating New Year did not come from 
nowhere: it is simply a reinforcement of earlier decisions. 
In fact as early as 1967, the new government of Suharto 
also banned Chinese New Year. The Central Java Police 
authorities commented that the present ban was a reminder 
that the old regulation is still in effect. 
The period between 1965 and 1967 was particularly bad: 
the Chinese became a target in the massive "red drive". 
Killings took place and many ethnic Chinese ended up in 
prison camps. 
In June 1967, Presidential Instruction No.37 /U/IN/6/1967 
concerning "The Basic Policy for the Solution of the 
Chinese Problem" was issued, followed by Presidential 
Instruction No.14/1967 on Religion, Beliefs and Chinese 
Customs. This was signed by acting President Suharto. 
These regulations implemented a series of harsh measures 
against the Chinese. The operation of Chinese language 
schools was prohibited: schools were closed down and the 
buildings were confiscated by the military authorities. 
Chinese cultural groups and trade associations were 
disbanded and the public display of Chinese characters and 
the selling of books and magazines in the Chinese language 
were prohibited. To this day, using Chinese characters to 
write envelopes sent abroad is prohibited, while letters with 
Chinese characters coming into the country are examined 
by intelligence officers. 
In another regulation the Indonesian authorities state that 
only one Chinese language daily, Harian Indonesia, is 
permitted. This publication is sponsored and controlled by 
the Indonesian military intelligence and mostly contains 
government communiques. 
Left to the mercy of the authorities 
The implementation of Presidential Instruction No.14 varies 
from place to place, depending on the flexibility and 
lenience of the local military authorities. But the ban still 
stands and frequently local officials will show their 
authority by reinforcing it. In the last few years pop music 
cassettes, laser discs and karaoke video recordings from 
Hongkong or Taiwan have been prohibited and on several 
occasions the police authorities have arranged publ~c 
burnings of the confiscated material. 
For example, in the beginning of 1989 a performance in 
Medan of the Chinese play Sam Pek Eng Tay (the Chinese 
version of Romeo and Juliet) was abruptly cancell,rd by the 
In Jakarta, Chinatown stalls were allowed to sell fruit and 
decorations for Chinese Lunar New Year. The celebrations had 
to be discrete and indoors. 
local military authorities. In April 1989, BAKIN, the 
Military Intelligence Body, ordered a ban on a performance 
by a Chinese Opera troupe from Taiwan. In January 1990, 
the Bandung municipality issued a ban on the use of 
Chinese characters in any form at offices of foundations, 
temples, houses of prayer and cemeteries. 
Changing names 
Indonesia is the only place in the entire Asia-Pacific region 
(or probably worldwide) where Chinatowns exist without 
public display of Chinese signs. In Presidential Instruction 
No.14/1967, Indonesian Chinese were strongly urged to 
change their names to 'native' names. Although there was 
no official ban on using Chinese names, the pressure on 
businessmen and youth was immense and the overall 
majority of ethnic Chinese changed their names in order to 
avoid discrimination. 
In 1959, the promulgation of Government Decree · PPlO, 
prohibited ethnic Chinese from trading below district level. 
As in many other parts of the Asia-Pacific region, a Jot of 
ethnic Chinese are small traders and shop-keepers. As a 
result of PPlO, an estimated 120,000 ethnic · Chinese lost 
their living and were shipped 'back' to mainland China. 
Others did not have the opportunity to leave and were held 
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as unwanted aliens in camps. [n North Sumatra and West 
Kalimantan, ethnic Chinese were held for years without any 
legal justification. 
The deterioration of relations between China and 
[ndonesia (in 1967 the diplomatic relations were frozen to 
be resumed only in August 1990) created problems for 
another 300,000 persons who formerly carried a Chinese 
passport. The Indonesian Immigration Office has divided 
this latest group into four categories and, with the renewal 
of diplomatic relations with Peking, will try to resolve this 
problem. 
"The final solution " 
The Indonesian Government refer to the issue of the 
Chinese minority as the "Chinese problem" (Masalah Cina). 
It is no accident that the June 1967 regulations were named 
as they were: their explicit intent was to accelerate the 
process of pembauran or assimilation. ln the regulations, 
pembauran is defined as the "eventual disappearance of a 
group as a socio-cultural entity". The plentiful racist 
measures mentioned before are a logical consequence of 
this 'final solution' policy. 
Before 1965 the term Tiong Hoa was commonly used to 
indicate Chinese ethnicity but the official term nowadays is 
Cina, a term having clearly derogatory connotations. 
Used as milch cows 
Despite the official policy of total assimilation, many 
fndonesian Chinese suffer from routine discrimination to 
serve both as milch cows and scape-goats for unscrupulous 
government officials. The notorious lndonesian red tape is 
used as an extra source of income for low paid officials and 
severely affects the ethnic Chinese. Extortion and bribery 
on a large and petty scale is common practice if an ID card, 
passport, birth, death or marriage certificate, name-change 
document or business licence has to be arranged. ln places 
Jike Jakarta, ID cards for the ethnic Chinese carry a special 
code, to distinguish them from the "locals". 
Widening gap 
One of the major sources of anti-Chinese sentiment is their 
relative success in trade and manufacturing. The economic 
boom of the eighties strongly enhanced the economic power 
of a smaJJ group of Chinese entrepreneurs. It is the era of 
accumulation and the dramatic growth of dozens of conglo-
merates. 
This spectacular growth is a common feature over the 
entire Asia-Pacific region but "the Chinese Factor", as the 
Indonesia Business Weekly calls it, exerts a dis-
proportionate grip on the economy. Only 2.1 per cent (or 5 
milJion) of Indonesia's 180 million people are ethnic 
Chinese, but according to the weekly they control some 75 
per cent of the country's wealth in comparison with the 10 
per cent of ethnic Chinese in the Philippines that control 68 
per cent of the economy or the 8 per cent in Thailand that 
control 60 per cent of the wealth and the 33 percent of 
Malaysian Chinese that control 67 per cent of the 
Malaysian economy. 
Anti-Chinese outbreaks have become endemic, and 
usuaJJy taking the form of rioting and shop looting. Any 
form of social protest can erupt into an anti-Chinese riot. 
[n 1981 anti-Chinese riots erupted in Semarang and Solo, 
foJJowed by Bandung in 1983. In October 1984, thre_e bomb 
attacks took place against Chinese banks and factones an~, 
in October 1986, Surabaya became the centre of antI-
Chinese riots that lasted for 10 days. 
Alliance with the power holders 
The emergence of the cukong, Chinese businessmen in 
alliance with Indonesian power holders, is creating anti-
Chinese sentiments among the impoverished masses. The 
Suharto family have close business ties with the biggest 
cukongs notably Sudono Salim (aka Liem Sioe Liang), Bob 
Hasan (aka Thee Kian Seng) and Prayogo Pangestu (Phang 
Djun Phen). 
The phenomena is also creating a new wave of Assaatism 
but on a much larger scale. Assaatism was first coined in 
the fifties and it was a policy of deliberately encouraging 
the "indigenous" traders while discriminating against the 
Chinese. Nowadays the attack on the Chinese is being led 
by Probosutedjo, the half-brother of President Suharto and 
himself a successful businessman and "cukong". Probosu-
tedjo now uses the same racist cliches as Assaat about the 
Chinese. 
The economic cooperation between Suharto and Liem Sioe 
Uong goes back to the fifties. 
Despite a long and deep tradition of acculturation, the 
Indonesian resentment and prejudice against the Chinese 
follow the stereotypes: The Chinese are 'economically 
strong', their loyalties towards Indonesia are doubtful, they 
lack nationalist feelings, they refuse to assimilate and 
integrate, and behave in an exclusive manner. Recent 
investments in China by Indonesian Chinese like Liem Sioe 
Liang, Oei Hong Leong and Oey Ek Tjhong (aka eka Tjipta 
Widjaya) has only strenghtened the views of people like 
Probosutedjo. 
Multi-ethnicity 
While the Indonesian archipelago is a very mixed and 
multi-ethnic place, official Indonesian policies ignore or 
even reject the global trend of multi-ethnicity. 
An estimated 90 per cent of lndonesian Chinese were born 
in Indonesia. The overall majority of Chinese arrived before 
1930, while Chinese settlements had existed long before the 
Europeans arrived. Many Chinese, in particular in Java, can 
claim to be a settled population going back for many 
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generations. The vast majority of the Indonesian Chinese 
only speak Bahasa Indonesia and other local languages and 
carry Indonesian passports. 
The ethnic Chinese, despite their centuries long presence 
in the archipeJago, are still however seen as a distinct ethnic 
group and are still viewed by many as aliens or outsiders. 
While for most, the eighties exemplified the global trend of 
the assertion of diversity and pride in ethnic and cultural 
identity, the clock in Jakarta went the opposite way. The 
Indonesian decision-makers heavily promoted uniformity in 
all fields : adherence to the State ideology Pancasila and the 
development of a Kepribadian Indonesia, a specific 
Indonesian identity, which is identical to the cultural 
patterns of a middle-class Javanese, the dominant ethnic 
group in Indonesia. 
After 25 years, it is clear that the strategy of total 
assimilation has failed to achieve its aim: the total 
disappearance of ethnic Chinese as a socio-cultural entity 
has not happened. Despite the progress of integration in 
mainstream Indonesian society, a countervailing trend is 
now emerging. Many of the young generation Indonesian 
Chinese, much more mobile and cosmopolitan than the 
previous generation, will not accept the idea of total 
immersion. The idea of accepting the cultural values of the 
ethnic Chinese within the diverse Indonesian society is 
gaining ground. 
The acceptance of many different cultural and ethnic 
values is an enrichment of society. For individuals or ethnic 
groups to be abJe to contribute positiveJy to the muJti-
ethnic society, they should be encouraged to strengthen 
their own roots and identity. Only then can acceptance and 
exchange of other cultural values occur in a fruitful way. 
This requires an open and democratic political system; it 
also requires the acceptance of multi-ethnicity as a reality. 
Both requirements are absent in present-day Indonesia. 
There is still a long way to go before the Chinese minority 
in Indonesia is truJy emancipated. ~ 
Draft Criminal Code under attack 
A draft bill to replace Indonesia~ Criminal Code is being strongly attacked for enabling stringent 
penalties for political opposition. Human rights lawyers have criticised it in particular for enabling 
harsh punishment against anyone critical of the government or ~preading hatred' of the authorities. 
The bill also introduces stiff penalties for couples who live together out of wedlock. 
Indonesia's Criminal Code [Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum 
Pidana, KUHP] is still based largely on laws introduced 
during the Dutch colonial era. A draft for a new KUHP to 
bring the country's penal code into line with contemporary 
society has been many years in the making and has already 
aroused wide controversy. 
In the name of protecting national stability, the drafters 
are leaving nothing to chance by giving the judiciary 
powers to pass the death sentence on anyone dissenting 
from government policy or on anyone associated with 
groups advocating Marxist ideology. One article would 
allow the death sentence, life imprisonment or a fixed-term 
maximum of twenty years or a minimum of seven years for 
"anyone who engages in activities to oppose the state 
ideology of Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution". Astounded 
by the severity of possible sentences, Mrs Amartiwi M. 
Saleh, former head of the Bandung Legal Aid Institute 
(LBH) warned that this meant courts could try and punish 
anyone who, say, proposed that there should be a maximum 
of two terms for the state presidency. This has been an 
issue recently as Suharto begins his sixth term as president. 
Another article allows the same penalties for "anyone in 
Indonesia who establishes or joins or has contact with or 
gives any kind of support to any organisation at home or 
abroad which is known to be, or ought to be known to be, 
founded on the principles of communism, marxism, 
lenin.ism ". 
The article comes in for harsh criticism from Abdul 
Hakim Garuda Nusantara, chair of the Indonesian Founda-
tion of Legal Aid Institutes (YLBHI) who asks: how will 
this affect Indonesian businessmen doing business with 
companies in China? And what about Indonesia's state 
contacts with several communist countries? 
Mrs Amartiwi rejects any reference to communism in the 
Criminal Code and takes issue with another article allowing 
the death sentence for "anyone who makes propaganda for 
or disseminates the ideas of communism, marxism, Leninism 
in all forms or manifestions ". In the view of these human 
rights lawyers, the draft as it stands needs a complete 
overhaul. [Editor, 27.II.1993] 
Anti-subversion law 'here to stay' 
These articles would appear to cover the kinds of 'crimes' 
dealt with in Indonesia's Anti-Subversion Law which is 
repeatedly used against the government's political oppo-
nents. This law was first introduced as a presidential decree 
by President Sukarno in 1963 and enacted into Jaw under 
Judge's decision according to wishes of the military 
Kompas 22 April 1989 
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Suharto in 1969. Indonesian human rights lawyers have 
repeatedly ca.lied for the Anti-Subversion Law to be 
scrapped. This demand was reinforced by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, Professor Kooijmans, in a report on 
his visit to Indonesia and East Timor in November 1991, 
calling for the Anti-Subversion Law to be repealed. 
Attorney-General, Singgih told a Legislative Assembly 
(DPR) commission that Indonesia still needs the law in 
order to quell underground activities. Although he conceded 
that the wording of the law could be adjusted, he insisted 
that the law is "here to stay". [Jakarta Post, 5.II.1993] 
Many commentators thought that the decision not to try 
East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, under the 
anti-subversion law was a sign that the law might be 
repealed but the Attorney-Genera] now makes a distinction 
between 'above-ground rebellion' (for which Xanana stands 
accused), which does not count as subversion and 'under-
ground' activities which do. He warned of subversion 
coming from "leftists, ie communists, or rightists, including 
Muslim hard-liners" and said that "subversive activities 
could increase without the deterrent imposed by the (anti-
subversion) Jaw". [Jakarta Post, 20.II.1993) 
'Hate-articles' tightened up 
Far from excluding the much-criticised 'hate-articles' which 
have been used against many critics of the government, the 
draft KUHP actually reinforces the wording of Article 154 
in the present KUHP. It would allow a maximum penalty 
of seven years for "anyone who in public expresses hostile 
feelings, hatred or contempt for the government such as 
might disturb stability in the fields of politics and security". 
"This is even worse than Article 154. Who is to decide 
how to .classify an act as one that disturbs the political and 
security situation? The addition of this provision makes the 
formulation even more open to abuse." [Editor, 27.II.1993] 
Punishing 'co-habitation' 
The draft bill has also aroused criticism from human rights 
activists for the inclusion of articles which criminalise co-
habitation between unmarried couples. A man and woman 
found guilty of living together will be liable to a penalty of 
up to seven years. A man who causes a woman to become 
pregnant and refuses to marry her will be liable to up to 
five years in prison. 
Other articles have been welcomed by human rights 
activists include stiff penalties for rapists, but an article 
which would have made marital rape an offence has been 
removed from the draft on the insistence of the Muslim 
lo~y. • 
Tortured for defending land rights 
As a UN human rights conference opened in Jakarta on 26 January, student activists were being 
severely tortured in detention. Involved in a peaceful protest against the expropriation of 150 ha of 
fertile land from the villagers of Blangguan, farmers and students were intimidated and tortured by 
security personnel. 
A land dispute 
The case began in the small isolated village of Blangguan. 
The 136 farmer families there have farmed the land since 
1923. But since 1992, they have been the targets of intimi-
dation by a local battalion of marines which has been 
claiming the land as a permanent war-games area. 
Throughout December 1992, the villagers, 600 in all, had 
their cornfields bombarded and their fields and fences 
destroyed by tanks. Homes were wrecked by tank attacks or 
by marines dismantling the roofs and taking the tiles and 
wood back to their base. 
The marines threatened to destroy all the villagers homes. 
The local food stall was ordered to close down permanently 
and farmers were told that if they planted any more com 
the marines would come and pull it out after one month's 
growth. 
The farmers had already protested to the local parliament 
to no avail. They were offered compensation of a mere 
Rp200 (10 US cents) per square metre of land. 
Military swarm Blangguan 
On 23 January, the day of the planned protest, involving the 
symbolic planting of com to show that the people depend 
on the land, the area was swarming with marines and 
intelligence officers. When KIRAB, the Blangguan Solidar-
ity Group, arrived at the village, they saw that it had been 
sealed off by troops. (TAPOL Bulletin, No 115, February 
1993.) 
Marines, supported by the police, blockaded the village, 
harassed and interrogated the villagers and local people 
passing by, and searched for students who had come from 
universities in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Semarang, and Salatiga. 
There were reports of women's screams being -heard as 
soldiers attempted to extract information. 
Police brutality 
On 25 January, the student members of KIRAB demon-
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strated at the local parliament. They presented the case to 
the local members of the armed forces, the PPP (devel-
opment unity party), PDI (democracy party) and Golkar (the 
government party). 
Despite a guarantee of safety being given to them, when 
the students left they were immediately surrounded by 50 
local military and police personnel. They were ordered to 
leave after presenting their identity cards. 
KIRAB headed to the bus terminal where they were 
approached again by intelligence officers. One officer 
approached a student, Irwan, from behind, grabbed his hair 
and began to punch him in the head. Meanwhile an officer 
shouted "Arrest them all!" Marines arrived and started to 
threaten the students with machetes. 
Seventeen students, including a woman, were rounded up 
and arrested. During interrogation they were severely tor-
tured by both police and navy in Surabaya (see box). 
Climate of fear 
While the students were being tortured in Surabaya, 
President Suharto was opening the Human Rights Asia-
Pacific Workshop in Jakarta. As Suharto was telling the 
workshop about Indonesia's own version of human rights 
principles, the students were being electrocuted and beaten. 
The Blangguan land case has become a testimony to the 
growing climate of terror and brutality perpetrated by the 
Indonesian security forces against the people of Indonesia. 
It is also a testimony to the lies of the regime's drive to be 
regarded as a advocate of human rights by the rest of the 
world. 
On 28 January, the government claimed that the dispute 
is over when it issued a decree stating that the disputed 
land in Blangguan is legally owned by the marines. There 
was no consultation with the villagers and no proper 
compensation. This is a situation to which the people of 
Indonesia are already accustomed. How much longer must 
they continue to experience violence and torture as a means 
of quelling protests for social justice? il 
Students electrocuted 
. ttHaving been force<i to strip down to.their underwear, 
· they were pill in damp cells measurmg 4 x 3 me~ 
a 25 watt bulb. They were bit repeatedly with 
· punched in the stoJ11ach, face and chest; 
.. . · oustacllCs and beards were burnt; and they 
. ~igiV~ electric Shocks. . .· .· . . . 
· •· · ~Blectrcicutfon. This was the ·most brutal method 
. ~~~tOyed, and is very effective iii Opening mouths, If 
.· · ~'. t'h.~ report from KIR.AIJ: · ~~ch shock usually 
· :·· ufl0-.15 minutes, atlQ~l5 '\VattsfZ25 volts. 
attached to the · . ·· ts' the littJe fingers 
and right haij < ·· · ·· ·· 
· ·· . intc)rrogatr .·.·. 
. ..·.... · .. 't 
~ · fen. . eight ·b<Hils 
\from 9am to _2pm 
'led serioUs mental . 
•\ othCl8 lrwan, and 
iS suffeJ.iiig from ioss·. · · 
·to coiltiol his emo1ions. 
Indonesians accused of implicit racism 
An lndonesian sociologist has accused lndonesian aca-
demics and the Indonesian press of "implicit racism" for 
ignoring the achievements of West Papuan intellectuals and 
cultural workers. George Aditjondro, senior lecturer in 
development studies at Satya Wacana University, Salatiga, 
said Indonesian academics regard Irianese, the name by 
which West Papuans are known in Indonesia, as having 
"brawn but no brains". 
Speaking at a seminar in Salatiga, Aditjondro mentioned 
leading Papuan academics: Wospakrik, an astronomer from 
Biak, Benny Nasendi from the Moi tribe and head of the 
Forestry Department in Jayapura, theologians Karel 
Philemon Erari and Benny Giai, Tom Wainggai, an econ-
omist trained in Japan who raised the Morning Star flag in 
Jayapura [and is now serving an eight-year sentence], and 
Daniel Ajemiseba, a linguist from Manokwari. Such people 
were rarely mentioned in the press, nor were their writings 
published. 
Among cultural workers Aditjondro mentioned Arnold Ap, 
curator of Cendrawasih University museum whose Mam-
,besak song-and-dance group popularised Papuan music. 
[Arnold Ap was killed by Indonesian troops in April 1984 
after being held in detention for several months. J He aJso 
mentioned the Black Brothers pop group which was 
acclaimed in Indonesia till they fled abroad and expressed 
support for the OPM. Now they were acclaimed in PNG 
and other_ Melanesian countries. 
Disputing the contempt in which Papuans life-styles were 
held, Aditjondro spoke of the creativity of mountain 
dwellers who used natural products to the full. The marrows 
they grow are used not only to eat. Some are allowed to 
grow old, then hollowed out and used as water-containers; 
young marrows are stretched and used as penis-gourds. 
[Suara Pembaruan, 17.XII.1993] ir 
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East Awin camp conditions exposed 
Early this year, mounting tension in the East Awin refugee camp in Papua New Guinea exploded, 
revealing that conditions of the West Papuan refugees are very unsatisfactory. Yet the UNHCR is 
reportedly planning to wind down its operations there. 
In January, between fifty and one hundred West Papuan 
refugees at the East Awin camp pulled down the flag of the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and in its 
place hoisted the West Papuan flag. In an event that has 
been played down in the PNG press, the refugees - mostly 
from the Blackwater and Waraston settlements at East Awin 
camp - were protesting to the PNG authorities and the 
UNHCR about aspects of camp management. The demon-
stration, reported all too sketchily in the press, protested 
that refugees were being required to pay for the use of 
UNHCR-provided vehicles to travel to Kiunga. 
Refugees arrested 
Seven of the West Papuans refugees were arrested, 
incJuding the demonstration's leader John Wakum. Reports 
suggest that he and three West Papuan women were 
responsible for exchanging the camp's flags. The case 
against Wakum, charged with threatening behaviour, was 
dismissed through lack of evidence in early February. 
The West Papuan refugees, in a statement giving voice to 
their frustrations, asked why the UNHCR, an organisation 
which relies on donations from states, had turned to 
"begging to ruin financially the West Papuan refugees at 
East Awin ... " 
More fundamentally, they complained that, after nine 
years of hardship and denial of genuine refugee status, they 
have still been granted no rights. They live under "the 
constant threat of extradition ... but cannot afford to pay for 
legal assistance." This policy, implemented by the PNG 
government and the UNHCR, is, say the refugees, "blocking 
our future". 
They also complained that the fact that there had been "no 
compensation to the landowners [of the East Awin site] for 
the use of their land by the PNG government has caused a 
lot of problems between the landowners and the West 
Papuan refugees". lndeed the landowners have lodged a 
formal protest with the government, threatening to move the 
refugees, who number between eight and nine thousand, off 
their land. 
In sum, they complained of an "active discouragement 
policy" carried out by the PNG government and the 
UNHCR towards the refugees "so that they hopefully will 
return to Irian Jaya/West Papua on a voluntary basis." 
Foodstore raid 
The complaints of the 50 West Papuan refugees at East 
Awin coincided with another event, when refugees at the 
same camp looted the camp's food store, taking 2,500 kinas 
worth of tinned meat, salt and rice. The PNG Department 
of Provincial Affairs had reportedly not yet received its 
1993 budget, nor had the refugees been receiving any 
support for some time. Following the raid, fifty-six people 
were charged with theft and destruction of property, and 
fined K80 each. After anonymous benefactors paid off their 
fines, they were returned to the camp. 
The frustrations manifested in these two recent incidents 
echo those communicated to TAPOL by refugees from East 
Awin in 1991 when the West Papuan Youth Solidarity 
Association wrote to the United Nations Centre for Human 
Rights to draw attention to their problems. They asked that 
due process for refugees seeking asylum be applied to them, 
and complained of a lack of housing, education, social, 
legal and employment assistance provided to the West 
Papuans at East Awin by the PNG authorities. This gross 
neglect has forced the refugees at East Awin camp to live -
as one described it - like prisoners for up to nine years. 
This denial of facilities violates the obligations entered into 
by PNG when it signed the 1951 Convention on Refugees 
and the 1967 Protocol. 
Two years later, the hope of fair and proper treatment for 
the refugees seems further away than ever. Far from 
stepping up its efforts to implement and protect the refug-
ees' rights, the UNHCR is reported to be scaling down its 
operations on the border, which will thereafter be controlled 
solely by the PNG government. The refugees have appar-
ently been given no assurances of a Jong term future in 
PNG, but suspect that the present policy of 'soft persuasion' 
will soon get harder. 
Indonesia wants the UNHCR out 
Meanwhile, the lndonesian authorities are making no secret 
of their discontent over the UNHCR presence in PNG. The 
Merauke district head, Raden Soepardjo, recently com-
plained about the continued presence in PNG of 150 
families from four sub-districts bordering with PNG who 
fled across the border following a clash with the OPM in 
Sota last year. It was regrettable, he said, that these people 
had been given protection by the UNHCR. "Why were we 
not informed so that the process for repatriating our citizens 
could begin?" Soepardjo said that lndonesia's strategy to 
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paralyse the armed resistance relies primarily on building 
close ties of friendship with PNG. [Kompas, 3-IIl-19931 
For the moment, those West Papuan refugees involved in 
the events described above have escaped widely feared 
deportation to Indonesia, where there would be little 
guarantee of their safety. Yet while their future has never 
really lain in the hands of the UNHCR, it is now being 
threatened by the ever closer relations between PNG and 
Indonesia. In February 1993, PNG Prime Minister Paias 
Wingti built another bridge between the two countries, 
taking a brigade of around 200 PNG businessmen and 
politicians to Jakarta for his state visit. 
In a discussion with their PNG counterparts, Indonesian 
parliamentarians sought their views on dealing with the 
OPM and suggested that an extradition treaty between the 
two countries would be beneficial to both. Had such a 
treaty already been in place, the refugees who unfurled the 
West Papuan flag at East Awin could have been handed 
over to the Indonesian authorities for staging an act of 
hostility against the state of Indonesia. 
PNG prisoners maltreated 
Two Papua New Guineans are being held in an Indonesian 
Darkness over Yamdena report 
When you know your long-awaited announcement is going 
to be controversial, tell everyone they won't like it, and then 
tell them you've decided not to let them hear it anyway. 
A strange tactic perhaps. Nonetheless it was used in an 
announcement by the then Forestry Minister Hasjrul 
Harahap about Y amdena at the beginning of March. Its 
style was an all-too-blatant exposure of the regime's 
attitude towards of public opinion and freedom of 
information. 
The government had been due to release the results of an 
environmental review of Y amdena, initiated last July after 
persistent protests by local Tanimbarese about the logging 
activities of PT Alam Nusa on their island. 
Speaking in Jakarta, Hasjrul said that the decision on 
whether to allow logging activities to continue, based on 
the study, would be sure to provoke public reaction one 
way or another. And so as not to disturb the ongoing 
General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly 
(MPR), he said he had decided to announce the results 
2700km away in Y amdena itself. 
"It will be easier to muffle the reactions in Maluku than 
here," he said. 
In July of last year, Tanimbarese had staged a 
demonstration outside the MPR in Jakarta. Then in 
September, islanders protesting against the logging on 
Y amdena were beaten up by police. 
Although there have been no reports to date of the actual 
announcement in Yamdena, Skephi sources reveal that f 
Hasjrul had actually signed an agreement with PT Alam · 
Nusa .for the continuation of logging activities on February 
27. The 'Company, Skephi said, had moved its heavy 
equipment 'from a field under Skephi's observation in order 
to avoid local residents' ire should th~y not accept the 
governm~t's decision. [Jakarta Post 1 & 3.IIl.93} 
military prison in West Papua for illegally crossing the 
border last October. Noel Lessai and Phillip Poma are 
reported to be in poor health and suffering from m~­
treatment, according to the Individual and Commumty 
Rights Advocacy Forum (ICRAF) based in Port Moresby. 
The men, who appear to have been traditional border 
crossers, were reported to have been fishing across the 
international boundary. When they went into Jayapura to 
buy fish hoooks, they were arrested for having no immigra-
tion documents. They have appeared in court five times -
the latest on 20 February - defended by the Indonesian 
Legal Aid Institute, the LBH, but on each occasion the case 
has been adjourned, apparently for lack of witnesses. 
The two men's families and ICRAF are concerned about 
their treatment in the Abepura military prison, just outside 
Jayapura. Their poor health was confirmed by a medical 
orderly from the PNG Department of Health in Vanimo 
who visited the two men. Phillip Poma, it was revealed, 
suffered from a hernia early this year. 
The Indonesian authorities have said they will release 
them on bail of about K1500 but their relatives cannot 
afford it. One of the men, Noel Lissai, is thought to have 
been in contact with the OPM, and it is likely that the 
mistreatment the men are receiving is a result of this. 
Secret deal? 
Several refugees in East Awin have been refused papers to 
travel abroad briefly to fulfil invitations from overseas. Rev. 
Karel Waromi was prevented from attending a UN meeting 
of indigenous people. It suggests that there may be a secret 
agreement between PNG and Indonesia for no ID cards to 
be issued, under any circumstances. ~ 
Continued from page 8 
were allegedly killed, their possessions looted and houses 
burned to the ground. Satumino allegedly 'confesses' that he 
acted as a courier between the guerrillas and the clandestine 
movement. There is no hint in the press that Satumino's 
testimony was challenged by the defence lawyer, Sudjono, 
as a gross violation. Perhaps he did, but the press was 
'advised' not to report it. 
This incident again highlights the fact that Saturnino's 
life is in grave danger. TAPOL has been informed that 
a request by an International Red Cross delegate to 
meet Saturnino following his appearance in court on 4 
March was turned down. 
The only witness to appear on that day was Akuilong 
alias Lui Tjung Nan, a truck-driver who told the court that 
he had transported Xanana on several occasions from Dili 
to Same for meetings at the home of Luis Cardo,so, the 
local village chief. 
Trial timetable revised 
When the trial began, the court announced a detailed 
timetable with the verdict due on 20 March. Then, after a 
couple of weeks of so-called 'marathon' hearings, the 
proceedings slowed down, at first to twice a week, then 
once a week. As a result, witnesses were still being heard 
right up to late March. In a change of plans, it was 
announced on 19 March that the trial would end at the 
earliest by the end of April. The revised timetable suggests 
that Jakarta is now manipulating the trial to dovetail with 
plans for a move at the UN-sponsored talks due to take 
place in Rome on 20 April. ir 
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Human rights under the spotlight 
Indonesia~ record as a violator of human rights is thoroughly assessed in several publications 
produced in the last couple of months. Readers and government officials wishing to understand the 
scale of the problem would do well to study them all. 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Broken Laws, 
Broken Bodies, Torture and the Right to Redress in 
Indonesia, 90 pages. Copies available for $10 from the 
LCHR, 330 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10001. 
When seeking to defend themselves against accusations 
regarding the abuse of human rights, Indonesian officials 
insist that they cannot be faulted because of their use of due 
process for persons suspected of posing a threat to the 
government or to 'national stability'. Indeed as compared to 
the early years of Suharto's New Order, far fewer people 
are being held without trial; the proportion of detainees 
brought to trial these days is far higher. But how much of 
an improvement is this? 
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has produced 
the most thorough-going study yet of how the law enforce-
ment agencies operate, the almost .unsurmountable diffi-
culties confronting lawyers and the failure of the judiciary 
to perform an independent role. From the moment a person 
is arrested, whether for criminal or political reasons, he/she 
is the likely victim of torture or rape, threats and intimida-
tion, without access to legal assistance and facing a virtual 
conspiracy between police, prosecutors and judges to 
prevent defendants from defending themselves and seeking 
redress for the wrongs they suffer while in custody. 
For the purposes of their investigation, the LCHR sent a 
fact-finding mission to Indonesia in June/July last year and 
collected information from a variety of sources. Predictably, 
its request to the Indonesian government to meet with 
government officials has been met with stony silence. 
The study recognises from the outset that a nation's justice 
system is inseparable from the political system within 
which it exists and that the Indonesian justice system is 
defined by a centralised, bureaucratic system that is domi-
nated by the executive and the military. This shows through 
at every level, even where innovative laws have been 
enacted to protect the detainee. When the new Criminal 
Procedure Code [KUHAP] was enacted in 1981, lawyers 
welcomed in · particular the pra-pengadilan (pre-trial) 
procedure enabling wronged detainees to seek speedy 
redress, but today, these same lawyers have serious doubts 
about its value; it has proven ineffectual either in protecting 
people's rights or reducing the incidence of torture during 
detention. 
KUHAP introduced many other improvements, in particu-
lar by stipulating that it is for the-police, not the military, 
to arrest and detain suspects and to conduct interrogations. 
But in practice, the police are just as liable to mal-treat 
their captives, and in any case, the KUHAP included a 
'transitional' clause exempting 'national security' cases from 
the provisions of the Code. 
There are areas where the LCHR study is misleading. 
Bakorstanas, the security agency which replaced Kopkamtib 
in 1988 is wrongfully described as "nominally civilian". It 
is in fact chaired by the armed forces commander-in-chief 
or the military commanders in the regions although, unlike 
its predecessor, it is supposed to include civilian officials 
(how far this is so is difficult to tell as it never meets in 
public). It is also rather misleading to state that press 
censorship has lessened considerably in recent years as 
newspapers are left in no doubt that they operate within 
very strict limits although the system works less through 
bans and more by threats and instructions over the phone 
and the ever-present danger of losing one's licence to 
publish. 
The bleak conditions in which victims of the system and 
their largely powerless lawyers function is portrayed 
vigorously and accurately by these New York-based· 
lawyers. Perhaps the message of their study is best summed 
up in the words of a lieutenant-colonel who told a student 
in his custody who was asking for a lawyer: "We (the 
military) make the rules. We can change the rules. You 
can't have a lawyer." 
The book should be compulsory reading for all foreign 
ministry officials around the world who deal with Indonesia 
and all foreign diplomats in Jakarta. Foreign journalists in 
Jakarta should also arm themselves with a copy. It is 
detailed and avoids rhetoric, it is well-documented and is 
based firmly on the views and experiences of lawyers and 
victims in Indonesia. Hopefully, it will get the wide 
distribution it so justly deserves. 
Amnesty International, Indonesia/East Timor: A New 
Order? Human rights in 1992, February 1993. (AI Index 
ASA 21/03/93.) 
This year's Amnesty International report spares no punches; 
Strongly worded and hard hitting, the report condemns the 
Indonesian regime and scorns its hypocrisy: their public 
facade is of a country making a positive shift toward human 
rights but "the grim factual record of human rights practice 
in 1992 tells a different story". 
The report finds that extra-judicial execution and 'disap-
pearance' have become a central part of the government's 
institutional repertoire. Torture, arbitrary detention, political 
imprisonment and the use of the death penalty have 
"continued without significant interruption," says the report. 
The central thrust is that human rights abuse is 
"institutionalised", with the country gripped in a climate of 
terror instilled by the regime through its security approach. 
The gravest violations of human rights were said to be in 
East Timor and Aceh, where "military authorities have been 
free to employ virtually any means in the interest of 
maintaining national security". The government forces 
executed and 'disappeared' scores of alleged supporters of 
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independence in these territories last year. 
Arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention and torture 
have been used, in the name of national stability, against 
striking workers, peaceful demonstrators and those advocat-
ing the rights of vulnerable communities. "Torture and ill-
treatment of political detainees, peaceful demonstrators and 
criminal suspects continued to be common and resulted in 
some deaths," says the report. 
The report remarks on the re-emergence of the shoot-to-
kill policy in Jakarta aimed at ridding the city of criminals: 
a policy reminiscent of the early 1980s when many thou-
sands of "suspected criminals" were shot by police in a 
state endorsed crackdown on crime. 
While Amnesty has over 180 prisoners of conscience, the 
report states that there are at least 300 other political 
prisoners, "if not more",_ who continue to serve lengthy 
sentences imposed after unfair trials. Twenty-two political 
prisoners were judicially executed between 1985 and 1992, 
most after serving twenty years in prison. , 
Amnesty ends the report with recommendations to the 
Indonesian government and the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights. The report finds that there has been "no 
fundamental change in the government's repressive posture 
toward political dissent" in Indonesia and East Timor since 
the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991. "Basic human rights 
continue to be violated in the name of national security, 
stability and order. Unless concrete measures are taken", 
warns the report, "there is every likelihood that this pattern 
of abuse will continue". 
This excellent 34-page report is an important document. 
Through it, Amnesty throws open the sham of Indonesia's 
public claims to advocate human rights. Human rights 
conferences held in Jakarta and pretty words to diplomats 
cannot mask the horrors perpetrated against the people ·Of 
Indonesia and East Timor.· 
US State Department, Washington: Human Rights Report 
For 1992: Chapter on Indonesia, February 1993. 
Compiled under the Bush administration, this year's US 
State Department report on human rights in Indonesia 
clearly recognises there are "serious human rights problems" 
in Indonesia and East Timor. The gist is somewhat ambigu-
ous: it .seems the authors wanted to encourage Indonesia's 
efforts, but that in the end, they found little progress to 
commend. The praise is over trivial factors such as foreign 
travel requirements being eased, while the attacks address 
fundamental issues of law and democracy. 
The report considers the government to be "authoritarian" 
and restrictive of all basic human rights. With regard to 
East Timor, the report notes that the government has "as yet 
made no response on the recommendations [of the UN 
Consensus statement of March 1992] nor has it allowed 
greater access to East Timor". Welcoming the disciplinary 
action against military involved in the Santa Cruz massacre, 
it notes that the Timorese got "extremely harsh sentences" 
while security officers were charged with relatively minor 
offenses. As for the Timorese trials, "while generally 
conducted in accordance with Indonesian Jaw, they failed to 
meet all international standards of fairness". Subversion 
trials in Aceh and North Sumatra were also unfair, a clear 
attack on the legal foundations on which the regime 
purports to rely. 
The report also questions the regime's concept of "democ-
racy". It notes "the inability of the citizen to change their 
government" which clearly challenges Suharto's Pancasila 
democracy as well as the validity of his recent election. 
Along with extra-judicial killings and unfair trials, the 
State Department lists torture and mistreatment of prisoners 
and detainees, arbitrary arrest and detention, arbitrary 
interference with privacy and significant restrictions on 
freedom of speech, press, assembly and movement as 
endemic problems in Indonesia. 
Two other issues which are highlighted are the recognition 
that official and informal discrimination against ethnic 
Chinese persists and the issue of labour. A fairly lengthy 
and detailed consideration of workers' rights recognises that 
it is impossible for Indonesian workers to form trade unions 
in practice and that the government and military are 
involved at all levels of the one official union. 
The Lawyer's Committee whose credentials are well 
established with the book reviewed above, will be produc-
ing a critique of this report in due course. 
LBH receives 'Liberty Award' 
The Indonesian Legal Aid Institute Foundation, the YLBHI, 
has received the Roger Baldwin Liberty Award from the 
Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights for "outstanding 
commitment to the causes of civil liberties and human 
rights". 
Soekardjo Adidjojo, chair of the Foundation's board of 
trustees, and executive director Abdul Hakim Nusantara 
accepted the award. The LCHR said both have worked to 
promote respect for human rights in Indonesia and have 
stood up for the rights of political detainees whilst the 
Foundation has been the target of government harassment. 
The Lawyers' Committee noted that because the YLBHI 
receiv(fs foreign funds as a registered non-governmental 
organisation, the Indonesian government has accused it of 
serving foreign interests and damaging Indonesia's name 
abroad. 1f. 
Continued from page 24 
The issue was raised by several NGOs, including the 
World Council of Churches, at the UN Human Rights 
Commission in Geneva in February. 
Army interference has aroused widespread consternation 
among Protestant_ churches particularly in Germany. The 
Protestant church in North Sumatra was founded by German 
missionaries and has close links with German churches. 
In a press reJe~e issued in Hanover on 23 January, the 
German Evangelical Church (EKD) described the HKBP as 
one of the largest Protestant churches in the third world. It 
condemned the arrest and maltreatment of church activists 
and priests and the fact that their release had been condi-
tional on accepting army-imposed decisions about the 
internal affairs of the church. Article 29 of the Indonesian 
Cons~itution gu.a~antees r~ligious freedom and recognises 
the nght of rehgmus bodies to manage their own affairs. 
Hence, what has happened is in breach of the Constitution. 
It is also ~ breach of the UN Convention Against Torture 
or . Pegradmg Treatment or Punishment, of which Indonesia 
is a signatory, said the EKD. * 
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Arms sales briefs 
Clinching German arms deals 
Chancellor Kohl and Suharto shook hands on lucrative arms 
contracts during the German leader's two-week Asian tour 
in February. Indonesia is getting 39 frigates, minesweepers 
and coastguard vessels from the arsenal of former East 
Germany plus three new submarines. The East German 
vessels were given almost free of charge, with Indonesia 
only incurring costs for refurbishing the ships. Authorisation 
for the deal was given last year by a top-secret government 
panel in time for Kohl's visit. 
Germany is having problems getting rid of the weapons 
inherited on unification, which by law it cannot deliver 
outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) if 
the client lies in a "region of tension." 
As the deal with Indonesia was being announced, the 
German Federal Security Council blocked Taiwan from 
buying 20 German submarines and corvettes for this reason 
(in fact triggering China's hostility was probably a more 
accurate assessment). Indonesia was given the green light 
because it is a member of the pro-western Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which enjoys similar 
status to NATO under Germany's arms control laws. The 
tensions of East Timor, Aceh and West Papua were 
conveniently ignored. 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) spokesman for 
security affairs, Norbert Gansel, attacked Kohl's "profligate 
weapons policyi' and said Indonesia should not get any 
military encouragement after its involvement in East Timor. 
Blossoming economic relations 
Economic relations between the two countries are 
blossoming. At the bilateral talks the two countries agreed 
to cooperate on the construction of passenger ships and a 
copper smelter in Gresik, East Java. Metallgesellschaft of 
Germany has been appointed to construct the shaft and will 
have a 55% interest in the project, with 45% interest held 
by Nippon Mining Co, Freeport Indonesia and Indonesian 
shareholders. 
Germany has also agreed to provide soft loans (annual 
interest rate of only 0.75%, maturing in 40 years, with 
grace period of 10 years) and grants of up to US$67.5 
million in 1993. This assistance is part of Germany's 
US$135.5 million pledge made during the Consultative 
. Group on Indonesia meeting in France last July. 
Kohl's price 
Understandably, Kohl was apprehensive of raising human 
rights with Suharto. Fearing that his host would be 
"somewhat ill at ease" discusS,ing human rights, Kohl told 
Suharto, "it is normal to discuss the issue among friends". 
Kohl was easily satisfied with the usual empty words 
about the regime's commitment to upholding the Universal 
Nations Declaration on Human Rights. 
Conveniently forgetting East Timor, Aceh and West 
Papua, Kohl left Indonesia in high spirits, claiming the talks 
a success. Clearly Kohl's concern for human rights has a 
price - and Suharto has paid it. 
[Source: Jakarta Post; Date: 24125126 February 1993) * 
Habibie's brother at 'Court of St James' 
In a surprise announcement, J.E. Habibie, the brother of Dr 
B.J. Habibie, Minister of Research and Technology and 
president-director of Indonesia's aerospace industry, 
lPTN, was named Indonesia's new ambassador to the 
United Kingdom in March. The younger Habibie has been 
the Director-General for Sea Communications at the 
Department of Transport and is popularly known as the 
'harbour king' because of his handling of huge takings to 
'facilitate' import passage through customs and excise. 
Normally, ambassadorial appointees come from the 
diplomatic corps or from the armed forces. J.E. Habibie 
comes from neither so his appointment as Jakarta's man at 
the Court of St James can only be explained by the 
importance attached by the regime to London as its leading 
base to equip the armed forces, and in particular to further 
enhance its close ties with British Aerospace, one of the 
older Habibie's most reliable partners. {l 
Picketing in front of the British Aerospace office. On the right: 
Carmel Budiardjo from TAPOL. 
Demonstrating against British Aerospace 
Members of British Aerospace/Ploughshares in Oxford who 
call themselves the Oxford Diggers, held a protest outside 
a British Aerospace factory in Stevenage, north of London, 
on 6 March. The banners and posters rang with angry 
condemnation of the company's deal to sell Hawk aircraft 
to Indonesia. Their slogans included: "No BAe Hawks to 
Indonesia!", "Remember Dili!" and "Hands off East Timor". 
This was the factory which peace activist Chris Cole 
managed to penetrate, inflicting considerable damage on 
aircraft nose-cones and a computer system. He is still in 
custody in Bedford Prison, having been refused bail. 
The demonstrators intended to carry out a mass trepass of 
the BAe complex but were prevented from entering the area 
by a heavy police presence, supported by a number of 
company security guards. ir 
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RELIGIOUS DISPUTES 
Army interference in Batak church continues 
Blatant army interference in the affairs of Indonesia's leading Protes1ant Church has continued 
unabated. The affair has caused the first major clash between Indonesian churches and the government 
since Suharto came to power. 
The North Sumatra military command, under its com-
mander, Major-Genera] Djoko Pramono, is continuing to 
impose its will upon the Huria Kristen Batak Protestan 
(HKBP), the Batak Protestant Church. The army-insta11ed 
acting head of the church unlawfu11y convened a General 
Synod in February and proceeded to appoint a new 'bishop'. 
This follows prolonged conflict in the church over who 
shouJd repJace the present Bishop (Ephorus), Dr S.A.E. 
Nababan, who was due to retire, and the move by the 
regional military command to impose an 'acting bishop' 
against the wishes of the vast majority of congregaticn. 
[See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 115, February 1993] 
In a move dearly intended to intimidate members of the 
congregation into accepting the army's intentions, troops 
rounded up dozens of church members, including many 
priests, and subjected them to persistent torture and mal-
treatment. 
Ruthless army intervention 
A chronology of their experience lasting from 17 - 22 
January 1993, which was written by Rev. RT Munthe, head 
of the HK.BP Information Bureau, has been made available 
to TAPOL. 
The nightmare began when troops surrounded a house in 
Medan where the Ephorus was staying and rounded up 
dozens of people who had gone there to greet him. Some 
40 people were driven off in army trucks, beaten and 
harangued during the journey, and taken to the district 
military command. After being photographed in pairs, they 
were forced out onto the parade ground and kicked and 
clubbed with rifle-butts and truncheons. The detainees were 
soon covered with bruises; many had bleeding noses, badly 
swollen faces and cuts all over their bodies. They were 
ordered to do push-ups, then to start beating each other. 
Many fainted, either from shock or from being concussed. 
These brutalities lasted nearly three hours. Among those 
subjected to such treatment were several women priests. 
Then 17 of the victims were taken to the intelligence 
headquarters of the regional security command, Bakorsta -
nasda, where their identities were again recorded and the 
beatings resumed. As they continued to beat, kick and strike 
us, Rev. Mun the wrote, "the troops yelled abuse, accusing 
us of rebelling against the government". Intelligence 
officers then began to vilify the Ephorus with allegations of 
corruption and relying on funds from Germany. The a....,use 
and physical attacks continued all night. 
The following day, during interrogations and further 
physical abuse, they were accused of insulting the military 
commander and warned to accept the army-backed 'acting 
bishop' or suffer the consequences. The officers even 
claimed that the church was led by communists and 
extremists who were allegedly instigating social protest. 
After several more days in custody, the detainees were 
ordered to sign a pledge as the condition for their release 
expressing support an extraordinary church Synod meeting 
convened with the backing of Bakorstanasda and accepting 
that they could be charged if they breached this undertak-
ing. 
'Grand Synod' challenged in court 
Soon after these horrific events, the army-backed extra-
ordinary Grand Synod was convened, with the backing of 
the regional military commander and proceeded to 'elect' a 
new bishop for 1993 to 1998. ! 
HKBP leaders are planning to challenge this decision 
through the courts. Several lawsuits are in preparation, one 
against the army-installed 'acting. bishop', Siahaan, for 
convening an unlawful meeting of the Grand Synod, 
another filed by several priests who have been dismissed by 
Siahaan. It is doubtful however whether the courts can be 
relied on to resolved the conflict. An earlier court decision 
when a judge found in favour of the HK.BP leadership was 
later overturned when the military appealed before the same 
court, though this time a different judge was presiding over 
the proceedings. The previous judge was said to be 'not 
available' to hear the case. 
Protests at home and abroad 
This army interference in church affairs has aroused strong 
opposition and protest, both in Indonesia and abroad. The 
Indonesian Communion of Churches (PGI) has criticised the 
move. On 7 January, the Jako.rta Post published an editorial 
criticising army interference and calling on the government 
to "retract the military appointment of a church leader in 
order to prevent further misunderstanding between the 
authorities and religious communities in this country". A 
Catholic youth organisation, Pemuda Katolik, has criticised 
the Medan military command for becoming involved in the 
internal affairs of the church and described this as a 
"negative precedent for religious life" in Indonesia. 
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